Understanding the Israel-Iran Conflict: Perspectives from Experts

If you look at what happened before this attack, it's quite clear from all sorts of reports that Trump colluded with the

Israelis to bamboozle the Iranians and leave them vulnerable to a surprise attack. When somebody's developing

nuclear weapons with the declared explicit aim of eradicating you and your children and your entire population,

then you don't worry about making them matter. They're already at maximum. We don't need any more wars in the Middle

East. In fact, we don't need any more wars. Period. For all those people who believe in the liberal international

order and talk about Western civilization, when you look at what's happening in Gaza and now what's

happening in Iran, we look like giant hypocrites. Do you think there'll be ground operations? There already are

ground operations. The Israelis have nuclear weapons, Freddy. You don't see them trying to get rid of their nuclear

weapons, do you? Of course you don't. And the reason is the Israelis understand full well they are the

ultimate deterrent. Why doesn't it apply to Iran? And it does. When Israelis talk about toppling the regime of the

Ayatollas, they are not talking about occupying militarily the nation of Iran. It just shows you how foolish the United

States is when it comes to executing strategy. We are on day five of the Israel Iran

conflict and already there seems to be two completely different understandings of what is going on that seem

unbridgegably divided. In one camp, this is understood as the brave and lonely Israeli government necessarily defending

itself from a neighbor that is hellbent on its destruction and in fact doing the world's dirty work by taking out

dangerous nuclear capabilities of a regime in Thran that is a threat to the whole world as usual being greeted with

condemnation instead of applause. That's one view. The opposite view is that a reckless government in Israel, hellbent

on its own political survival, is adding a new front to an already shameful destruction in Gaza, causing havoc,

threatening world peace, and in fact being given a free pass by a morally weak West. That's the alternative

extreme view. So, how should we try to make sense of it today? Instead of offering a fiery debate between two

opposing sides, flamethrowing and insulting each other, we thought we'd find the very best, most eloquent and

interesting, subtle spokespeople for each side and talk to them in sequence. First, we're going to talk to the world

famous professor John Meshimer. This is someone who describes himself as a realist, someone who has been very vocal

and influential in understanding the Ukraine Russia conflict and has been a searing critic of Israel. He has written

whole books about what he calls the Israel lobby. He feels Israel's influence on the United States is much

too strong and we felt that he would be an interesting person to put this conflict into context from that

perspective. Then we're going to talk to Professor Yoram Hazani also highly influential both inside Israel where he

is resident and has lived most of his life but also inside the United States and Europe because as the founder of the

national conservatism movement that now holds conferences across the world. He is really a big inspiration for people

inside MAGA, inside the Trump movement and inside nationalist conservative movements across Europe. So it will be

fascinating to hear from Professor Hzani how he believes this is in Israel's national interest and whether he thinks

the United States has a national interest in getting involved. Hopefully at the end of hearing from both of them

we will be if not completely clear at least better educated about the different arguments on both sides.

John Mshimemer welcome to unheard. Hello Freddy. Let me start with the biggest question which is what do you think

Israel is trying to achieve? Well, I think their ultimate goal is to eliminate Iran's nuclear capability, and

basically that means making sure Iran has no enrichment. I think if they could get regime change, they would be happy

with that. But I don't think that's the principal goal. I think the principal goal is to eliminate Iran's nuclear

capability or its ability to get a nuclear weapon. And I think to do that, they have to get the Americans in. I

think they went into this thinking that by themselves they could not uh eliminate uh Iran's nuclear enrichment

capability. They'd need the Americans to do that. And I think they believe that once they got into it and the war

developed, the Americans would come in and the Americans would do their dirty work for them. Well, let's just there's

two components to that. So on on the nuclear aspect, do you think it's fair enough that they cannot tolerate a

neighbor that is avowed to their destruction having nuclear weapons? Well, I think they obviously don't want

Iran to have nuclear weapons for what are good strategic reasons from their point of view. And I would add to that,

the United States does not want Iran to have nuclear weapons either. But the $64,000 question is whether or not we

can prevent that. Meaning the United States and or Israel. And the fact is that if they want to get nuclear

weapons, there's nothing we can do to stop them. And all sorts of experts have said that. Uh I recently heard Ahood

Barack making that point, former prime minister of Israel. you just can't prevent it if they decide they want to

do it. And I certainly think that this Israeli operation is not going to do much at all to eliminate their

enrichment capability. So you as a as a realist would say uh the the strategic objective is understandable, but you

don't think they will achieve it through this method. So it's a kind of pointless attack. Yeah. I I think the Israelis by

themselves cannot do it. Almost everybody I know agreed with that basic point before the operation that the

Israelis by themselves couldn't do it. It looked like we might, we meaning the Americans might be able to do it because

we have these 30,000 lb uh massive bombs that may be able to go down far enough into the ground to eliminate their

enrichment capability. But the problem there, Freddy, is that even if you do eliminate the capability now, they'll

just rebuild it. And I would note to you that they have announced that they have recently opened the third enrichment

plant. And this one is even buried more deeply into the ground than the one at Fort, which is the one that we've been

concentrating on recently. So I I just don't think that over the long term you can eliminate their or Iran's nuclear

capability with military force. The second part of what you said is that you think key to their strategy is getting

the Americans directly involved. Is that playing out? Do you think it's going to happen? How do you see it playing out

next? Well, it hasn't happened yet. the there's no question the United States has been giving the Israelis assistance

both before the operation started and since the operation has started but uh Trump has gone to great lengths to make

sure that we don't get sucked into this and if you listen to him talk uh over time it's not likely that we will get

pulled in. Uh what's happening here is he is watching how little success the Israelis are having and then thinking uh

what does this mean for us? You want to remember we went to war against the Houthies. We were going to destroy the

Houthi military capability. Trump promised that after 30 days Trump quit. He said the Houthies won. We couldn't

defeat the Houthis. we couldn't eliminate their ability to launch missiles at ships in the Red Sea or to

launch missiles at Israel. Well, if we couldn't defeat the Houthis, uh, is it really plausible to think that we can go

in with military force and do the job on Iran? I don't think so. I mean, if you look at the history of air power, it's

quite clear that it has some utility, but not great utility. uh when it comes to defeating an adversary, what you

invariably have to do is go in on the ground. And we're not going in on the ground in Iran, nor are the Israelis. So

what are we going to do in terms of eliminating this nuclear capability that Iran has with air power or missiles

alone? And I think the answer is just not much. I mean a lot of people reading Western newspapers and watching the

coverage over the past 3 days will conclude the opposite I think which is that it seems to have been pretty

effective. Chunks of the military leadership have been taken out. One of the leading nuclear scientists has been

taken out. Some of their military capacity has been degraded. The response such as it has been has been somewhat

ineffectual. A very high percentage of rockets seem to have been intercepted by the Iron Dome. Right now, three or four

or 5 days in, it's looking like Israel one, Iran zero. Freddy, what's the goal here? The goal is to get rid of Iran's

nuclear enrichment capability and they haven't come close to doing that. And as I just said to you, they can't do it.

So, how does Israel win in your story? And basically, if you look at what's happening now, both sides are lobbing

missiles at each other and all sorts of destruction is taking place in Iran and Israel. And it's hard to see where the

arc ramp here is and how the Israelis ultimately win. So, I think the argument that Israel is in excellent shape after,

you know, four days of back and forth just simply is wrong. You describe yourself as a a realist in international

policy terms. Do you think this administration, the Trump administration is behaving in a realist way? I mean,

you've written a lot about the Israel lobby. Your general view seems to be that Israel has an extraordinary grip on

American administrations and generally is allowed to do whatever it likes. Do you feel like this administration is

different and that those new voices within the MAGA coalition that are more restrainist are winning out? No, I think

that the lobby basically gets what it wants from Trump. There is no evidence that Trump uh has stood up to the lobby

in any meaningful way. That's true, I think, both with regard to the Gaza genocide and with regard to what's

happening with Iran. Uh if you look at what happened before this attack, it's quite clear from all sorts of reports uh

in the mainstream media that Trump colluded with the Israelis to bamboozle the Iranians and leave them vulnerable

to a surprise attack. Uh we've provided the Israelis with huge numbers of bombs and all sorts of other military

equipment to wage war against Iran and to execute the genocide in Gaza. There's no evidence that Trump is standing up to

the lobby and I wouldn't expect him to. Well, he's not so far directly involved. I mean, even that is something, isn't

it? I mean, it may not be true in a week or a month or a year from now, but for now, he may be allowing it, but he is

keeping the US out. And if you believe the news reports, he vetoed an Israeli idea to try and assassinate the Supreme

Leader Ayatollah Kmeni. Do they not count as uh realist or restrainer credentials? Well, first of all, I don't

know whether he really did uh tell the Israelis that they couldn't try to kill Hani. Who knows where the truth lies on

this one. Truth is not something that uh Donald Trump is comfortable with. And uh one never knows what is really going on

behind the scenes, but there may be some minor instances like this where uh Trump stands up to Israel. I wouldn't be

surprised. But in terms of the basic relationship here, the Israelis get pretty much whatever they want, uh, as

they have for, you know, decades on end. And, you know, Freddy, I've argued for a long time, and I believe it's more true

than ever, that, uh, what the lobby wants for Israel is not in Israel's interest. I think if you look at where

Israel is today, it is in really deep trouble. And that's because the lobby makes it possible for the United States

to support Israel unconditionally. Israel can do anything it wants and we support them. And the lobby and Israel

itself think this is really all for the good. Uh I don't think it's all for the good and I think if you look at the

situation that Israel is in today, it is not a good one. How would you like the West such as it is to respond to this?

Respond to what? to the to the Israeli attack on Iran and the return fire. I mean, if you were in charge either of

the US or the some kind of Western coalition, what would you like to see? Condemnation of the Israeli strikes,

some kind of intervention. What should other Western countries be doing, do you think? Well, the only country that

counts here is the United States. And the United States should have put great pressure on Israel not to launch this

attack. Uh what we should have done is worked out uh an agreement with the Iranians similar to the JCPOA agreement

that the Obama administration worked out. If that failed and the Israelis went to war anyway, we should have gone

to great lengths or we should be going to great lengths now to shut the war down. uh it's just not in our interest

to see this war go on because it may escalate and the greatest threat to us is if it turns into a war that leads to

the Iranians shutting down the Persian Gulf uh and the Houthis helping them to shut down the Red Sea. Uh this will I

think have disastrous consequences for the world economy. That's certainly not in our interest. So I think we have an

interest in shutting down the war. But again, I want to emphasize uh we should have shut down any talk of a war or any

threat of a war uh before it happened uh last week. Let's just try a couple of hypotheticals here. If the Iranians do

attempt to shut down the straight of Hummus or really in get involved in those shipping lanes, what should

America do? Well, I think the United States will go to great lengths to try to open up the Gulf. uh probably use its

naval power. Uh I wouldn't be surprised if the Israelis would welcome this, right? I believe the Israelis will go to

great lengths to uh bait us to get involved in the war and this would be one way of doing that. You want to

remember in 2024 they tried to drag the Biden administration into a war against Iran on two separate occasions. one in

April of 2024 and then one in October of 2024. And both times the Biden administration

resisted and of course the Trump administration is resisting now because it's not in our interest to get involved

in a war in the Middle East. Uh and that's again not just true for Donald Trump, it was true for Joe Biden as

well. Uh so we're trying not to get into this, but if the war spins out of control and it involves interrupting the

oil supply uh coming out of the uh Persian Gulf and out of the Red Sea in a major way, I think it's likely the

United States would move in militarily. And that's something we don't want to happen. If that does happen, what does

that do for the United States's position in the world? I guess that's a whole new front. It's already trying to deal with

Ukraine and the the challenge from China. This would be another hot front. Is the United States powerful enough to

sustain efforts on three fronts? No question about that, Freddy. I've been arguing for a long time that the

principal threat the United States faces comes from China. And what we should be doing is focusing laserlike on

containing China. But we're not able to do that because number one, we're pinned down in Ukraine and number two, we're

pinned down in the Persian Gulf. Now, if you hypothesize a situation where an actual war breaks out in the Gulf that

involves us, we will have to move even more assets from East Asia to the Gulf. And this is certainly not in our

interest. We need those air and sea assets that we've been keeping in the Gulf in recent months in East Asia. Uh

this is not a good situation. The Nimmits, the USS Nimmits, a major league aircraft carrier is now leaving East

Asia to come to the Gulf. It should stay in East Asia. You want to remember it in the war against the Houthies, one of the

principal reasons that Trump quit that war is that we were expending ammunition, precious ammunition that we

might need in East Asia uh against the Houthies. And of course, it was having very little effect anyway. But uh it's

just important to understand that we're robbing Peter to pay Paul here and that is not in our interest because uh China

is the principal threat that the United States faces and we should be concentrating on pivoting fully to Asia

and containing China. Could you not make the argument that Donald Trump is actually behaving in quite a John

Meshimemerish kind of way over this conflict? He's saying fine, Israel has its own vital interests. if they want to

do stuff in Iran, he's going to step back and let them do that. And it might be useful to him in some ways to take

out some of their capacity. But he hasn't got America involved. So far, there is no US direct involvement. He

even appears to be kind of restraining some of the more dramatic ideas like taking out the Ayatollah.

If he gets away with it and the net result is a a weakened Iran with which has taken steps back in its nuclear

program and he avoids it spilling out to a wider conflict. Is that a win for the US? No, not at all. We have all sorts of

assets pinned down in the Middle East that we don't want to have there. They're better in East Asia. It's not in

our interest to have all those assets uh in the Middle East. Number one. And number two, as we were just talking

about, there's a serious chance we're going to get sucked into a war. The last thing we need is another forever war in

the Middle East. Trump was elected because he promised no more of these forever wars. And you want to remember

in his previous term as president, he was the one who set in motion us getting out of Afghanistan. Uh we'd probably

still be in Afghanistan if he hadn't set that train in motion. Uh so we don't need any more wars in the Middle East.

In fact, we don't need any more wars, period. We don't need a war in East Asia either. What we want to do is contain

China, not go to war with China. But to contain China, you need to concentrate on doing that job. And that means

keeping as many assets as possible in East Asia. And what's happening in the Middle East is certainly not in their

interest. And then there's the fact that this is doing enormous damage to our reputation. We support Israel, which is

seen as a rogue state by most other countries outside of the West. And furthermore, with regard to Gaza, we're

uh basically colluding with the Israelis uh in terms of the execution of their genocide against the Palestinians. This

is a disaster for us, for all those people who believe in the liberal international order and talk about

Western civilization. when you look at what's happening in Gaza and now what's happening in Iran, right? We look like

uh giant hypocrites. This is not in our interest. So, we have all sorts of reasons for wanting uh to put an end to

this war in Iran and for wanting to put an end to the uh to the uh genocide in Gaza. Whose interests do you think it is

in? Because one name that has come into frame is Vladimir Putin. It was notable that he seemed to be the only leader

that spoke to all three presidents or prime ministers involved uh in the 24 hours after the conflict broke out and

he's offered himself already as some kind of mediator to any peace solution. Do you think Russia benefits from this

war? I think Russia does benefit from this war. I think there's no question about that. Uh I think that uh it uh

gives Putin certain standing as you describe and it forces us to focus on the Middle East and take our eye off

Ukraine. Uh so this is I think a good situation for Russia. I think it's also a good situation for China. The Chinese

must be very happy about the present situation that we're in. We're pinned down in Ukraine and now we're pinned

down even more uh than ever in the Middle East. From a Chinese point of view, they should hope the Ukraine war

goes on forever because the United States will be unable to fully pivot to Asia because it's pinned down in

Ukraine. And now with this war going on in the Middle East, if we get sucked into it and we're fighting against the

Iranians in the Persian Gulf, this is mana from heaven for the Chinese, right? It just shows you how foolish the United

States is when it comes to executing strategy. Right? We're up against two first class strategists in Xi Jinping

and Vladimir Putin and they beat us at almost every turn. It's really quite remarkable. What do you think happens

next, Professor Mir Shimo? If you if you put on your prediction lenses, I mean, what do you think we'll see in the next

two weeks? I don't know for sure, Freddy. I mean, it looks like the Israelis are in a position where they

simply can't quit. And I think the Iranians are in a similar situation. The Israelis started this war and they

promised that they were going to lambbase the Iranians and achieve certain goals and to quit after a couple

days because you haven't had success at achieving those goals I think is extremely unlikely. Uh so I think the

Israelis uh will stay in the fight and it's hard for me to imagine the Iranians dropping out of the fight. Are they

going to admit defeat? I think that's unlikely. So I think unless the United States comes in with a heavy hand, the

fighting will go on. Now to argue against myself, one could say that's true if both sides don't run out of

weapons. But it is the case that maybe uh the Iranians will run out of missiles or the Israelis will reach the point

where their public just can't tolerate any more punishment. Uh and furthermore, their air force is being worn out on

these long trips to and from Iran and they want to call it quits. Uh I don't see either one of those things

happening. My sense is that the Iranians have more than enough missiles to continue for at least a couple more

weeks and I think the Israelis will continue as well. I don't think public opinion will force Netanyahu to call it

quits and I don't think the Israelis will reach the point where they don't have the ability to bomb uh Iran in a

meaningful way. So I I see this one going on. I again I think the the one chance that it comes to an end is if

Trump were to intervene. Uh and I think the scenario where that is most likely is one where uh you have an oil war as

we were talking about before. I think that's one of the two nightmare scenarios here. Uh an oil war which

would have again disastrous effects for the world economy and then the possibility at some point that the

Israelis think about using nuclear weapons. If you're the Israelis and you do really believe that Iran is an

existential threat and you can't uh eliminate that existential threat with conventional weapons, you may very well

begin to countenance uh using nuclear weapons to deal with the threat. Uh and I think if that were the case, the

Americans would move in with a heavy hand to prevent the Israelis from launching a nuclear attack on Iran.

Final question for you uh professor, we talked a little bit about the Iranian program and them enriching uranium.

What's your view on whether they are actually building nuclear weapons? Because we had Tulsi Gabbard just

earlier in March. She was saying that the United States intelligence community does not believe that Iran is currently

building a nuclear weapon. She said there's a stockpile of enriched uranium, there's nuclear ambition. She doesn't

think they're building a nuclear weapon. Is your view that they are and there's nothing we can do about it or that this

whole thing is not actually real? Well, something in between, Freddy, there I don't think they're building a nuclear

weapon at this point in time. But what they are doing is they are enriching uranium up to 60%.

And if you enrich uranium up to 90% then you have weaponsgrade material. And to get from 60% to 90% is very easy. All of

that is a way of saying that their enrichment capability is so sophisticated that they could easily

produce weapons material for probably about 10 bombs in I'd say two weeks time. But that's not a bomb. They would

then have to build a bomb and they would have to mount it on a ballistic missile that could deliver it. And most people

think that that would take about a year, maybe 10 months, maybe 14 months, but roughly a year. So it would take a good

year to build a deliverable bomb. But again, it would only take about two weeks to have weaponsgrade material. And

you could understand why from Israel's point of view this is an absolutely terrible situation. So, so, so the

argument here is not that Iran is developing a bomb, but it's getting close to the point where it would be

easy to move to having a bomb. And what the Israelis want to do, of course, is they want to eliminate that enrichment

capability because once you get rid of uh Iran's ability to enrich uranium, then they can't build the bomb. And and

by the way, the JCPOA uh the nuclear agreement that the Obama administration

worked out uh in 2015 uh with the Iranians and a handful of other countries was designed not to

eliminate the enrichment capability, but to make it virtually impossible for Iran to enrich uranium to the point where

they had weapons material. And of course, the Israelis hated the JCPOA. And the Israelis pushed the first Trump

administration to walk away from the JCPOA simply because it left Iran with an enrichment capability. So even though

Iran couldn't enrich up to 90% under the JCPOA, the mere fact that Iran had an enrichment capability was unacceptable

to the Israelis. And again, I can understand why that is unacceptable to the Israelis. But the question you have

to ask yourself is, what can they do about that? Can they eliminate that enrichment capability once and for all?

And the answer is that they can't. And I don't think we can either. And this is why the Obama administration argued that

the best alternative was to have this agreement that greatly limited their ability to enrich up to weaponsgrade

material. But uh the long answer is that or the short answer is Freddy that uh uh they're not developing a bomb. But so it

sounds like you are almost fatalistic about it that you think if they really want it Iran will have weapons grade

uranium and if they want to mount it onto a warhead they can. Let me make two points. I think that we could have had

another JCPOA like agreement and maybe even a better one and they would not have developed the bomb. Right? So I I

think that there's no way we could have gotten the Iranians to give up their ability to enrich which the Israelis

find unacceptable. But I think the second best alternative here uh or the least bad alternative, I

guess that's a better way of putting it, is to have a situation where you have a JCPOA. But the idea that you're going to

go out and get the Iranian nuclear capability and eliminate it once and for all is just not in the cards. You just

can't do that. And my second point that I would make to you is I think you want to ask yourself whether or not the

Iranians are going to get a bomb after what's happened over the past couple days. I've long argued that if I were

the national security advisor in Iran, they would have had a bomb a long time ago. I think from Iran's point of view,

they were foolish not to get a bomb long ago. Uh, look at Kim Jong-un and North Korea. We're not going to attack North

Korea. The South Koreans are not going to attack North Korea because North Korea has nuclear weapons. Iran doesn't

have nuclear weapons. Libya didn't have nuclear weapons. Iraq didn't have nuclear weapons. If you don't have

nuclear weapons, the United States or the Israelis will attack you. The lesson that comes out of this whole

uh conflict so far is that Iran has more powerful incentives than ever to acquire nuclear weapons. So hopefully that won't

happen. But you can make a very good case that if anything this operation makes it more likely, not less likely

that they'll get nuclear weapons. My final point on this which I think illustrates um why Iran should have

gotten nuclear weapons is that a number of years ago ahood Barack the former prime minister of Israel said that I

believe Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons because it makes so much strategic sense. Just think about what

Barack was saying. He understood that from Iran's point of view, it made strategic sense to get nuclear weapons.

I mean, just look at the Israelis and the Americans. The Israelis have nuclear weapons, Freddy. You don't see them

trying to get rid of their nuclear weapons, do you? Of course, you don't. And the reason is the Israelis

understood understand full well they are the ultimate deterrent. You don't see the United States that has the most

powerful conventional forces on the planet getting rid of its nuclear weapons, do you? No. Why? Because they

are the ultimate deterrent. Well, what's good for the goose is good for the gander. And if that logic applies to

Israel and the United States, and it does, why doesn't it apply to Iran? And it does. And again, if Iran had nuclear

weapons, I don't think this war that's now taking place would be taking place. So, I think if anything, we're worse off

with regard to preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons. And again, I want to emphasize that from an American

point of view, it's not in their interest to see Iran have nuclear weapons. I'm not making the argument to

hear that it would be good if Iran had nuclear weapons. It would not. We do not want them to have nuclear weapons

because we understand what the proliferation consequences are of that happening. And there are all sorts of

other downsides as well. But uh again, I'm not sure this is a smart way to go about preventing Iran from becoming a

nuclear weapons state. John Mir Shima, thank you for your time. Next up, we are joined by Professor Yoram Hazani from

Jerusalem where he is a professor and where he has been kept up most of the night by sirens and alarms as the

rockets continue to fall. Uh, Professor Hzani is also the author of the virtue of nationalism which is just about to be

reissued. a very influential book and in a sense part of the founding of the nationalism movement that has swept up

so much of Europe and of course the United States administration. He remains a very big source of inspiration for

people across the Trump movement as well as those governments that are turning more nationalist in Europe. So we've

been really looking forward to hearing from you professor and uh welcome to unhar. Absolutely. Thank you Yuram. Let

me start by asking what do you believe the purpose of this Israeli action actually is? Let's think back to October

7th, 2023 with the horrific surprise invasion of Israel from Gaza by uh Iranian supplied Iranianbacked

uh Iranianfunded uh kamas terrorist organization. Now, if you remember those days, uh a

few within a few days after that attack, Prime Minister Netanyahu, his uh the chief of the general military staff and

the defense minister appeared on Israeli television, spoke before the uh the Israeli and Jewish people and before the

world and described the war that was coming. And uh Netanyahu's description was of a long war. He said that it will

be a war of months if not years and uh the the outline was already there. It was clear that the uh the source of this

um uh horrific uh atrocity was in Iran and uh that the the goal would have to be to peel back stage by stage uh the

protective layers of Iranian proxies that had uh been built up over 25 years uh on Israel's borders and then

eventually to take the war to Iran. So what what we are seeing now uh over the last few days is the culmination of that

Israeli campaign that was promised back in those days. Israel has in fact been at war with with Iran for decades. But

the the stage at which the Iranians thought that they would be able uh to move quickly uh to destroy Israel, we

finally reached there and the Israeli uh public left and right is uh uh completely united uh around the clear

understanding that that this is a a genocidal regime which has promised to destroy Israel many many times on a

daily basis chance death to Israel. And Israel can't live with an Iranian nuclear weapon. Israel can't live with

ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads and can reach the state of Israel. And and by the way, reach

plenty of other countries as well. But our interest at the moment is uh is absolutely clear. It's been the same as

it has been for the last two years. Uh which is to eliminate Iran's nuclear capacity. Do you think that is an

achievable objective? There's the specific question of nuclear capacity that can be eroded if not completely

destroyed. But the underlying question which you started with which is why does this regime continue to fund proxies

that are intent on the destruction of Israel? Will that be helped or hindered by bombing Iran? I mean even if it's

successful in the short term, won't Israel just increase the enmity that uh that regime feels towards Israel?

It it's a completely fair question, but I I I hope you don't don't don't mind if mind a frank answer. When somebody's

developing uh nuclear weapons with the declared explicit aim of eradicating you and your children and your entire

population, then you don't worry about making them matter. They're already at maximum. And so the things can only

improve from where they are right now from the perspective of the state of Israel. With regard to your your

particular question, is it possible for us to uh achieve the elimination of Iran's nuclear program? The answer is

absolutely yes. It's possible. I'm not saying that it's uh simple because as you know uh some of these uh facilities

are are are buried deep underground under mountains. The options for Israel to uh attack those facilities alone they

do exist. uh there's a number of possible ways in which even under forda and and other sites buried deep

underground there are ways that given time Israel should be able to uh to do this alone but of course these days

there's also the question that the Americans are going to be deciding about whether they are going to join into the

into the campaign this not something I would call for it's not something I would ever ask for the Americans have to

make that decision themselves uh but one of the possibil possible ways that this is going to unfold uh is that President

Trump decides that it's in the American national interest uh and that they they assist with the particularly difficult

aspects of this campaign. I mean, this is now getting to the heart of it because there's a lot of paranoia and

allegations around this that actually all of this is a precursor to involving the US directly. I mean, do you believe

that it is Israel's objective to get the Americans directly involved because, as you seem to imply, they're kind of

necessary to complete the job as regards to nuclear facilities. No, I I don't think that they're necessary. That's

certainly not Israel's official position, and I believe Israel's official position is is in fact

realistic. My friend, the foreign minister Gidonsar and the national security advisor Takahi, both of them

have uh clarified in the last couple of days that this campaign has been designed by Israel to end the uh Iranian

nuclear program uh on the basis of Israel alone and uh the the the details of this I I I don't think it's

responsible for me to go too far into this, but uh suffice is to say that Israel in the last two years has uh

practiced this is a matter of public knowledge. Anyone can check this different techniques for using the

arsenal that that Israel has at this time uh for tunneling uh deep underground. We've used that effectively

against theah and also for ground operations against sensitive sites uh and and there and there are other

options. Israel given enough time Israel can do this alone. Do you think there'll be ground operations, Professor Hazania?

That's that's well there there already are ground operations. The reason for the extraordinary successes of Israel in

the first uh several days of this war is because Mossad is active all over Iran. Iran's been our number one enemy for 20

years and these uh these operations have been planned over the carefully over the course of 20 years. You got to see the

way it works and the way it comes to fruition uh already in in the war againstah and the same techniques many

of the same techniques have already been used in the war against Iran. Yes, Israel has the capacity to do it. The

difference between Israel's capacity and America's capacity is that the United States can send in B2 bombers and drop

uh munitions that are much much larger than anything that that that Israel has. But Israel will complete this operation

uh with or without the United States. That's not that's not a uh a slogan. That's a plan. That that is what is in

fact planned. Are you surprised by the level of division on the political right in the United States about this? I mean

your thinking, your way of your philosophy of national conservatism has been a big source of inspiration for

many people within the MAGA movement. And now we find that it's divided into itself with people like Tucker Carlson

really very strongly advocating what he would call restraint. You know, others might call isolationism, staying out of

conflicts like this and others now apparently including the president himself saying that it is crucial to

America's national interest that Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons. Are you surprised by the level of division and

what do you make of it? Well, look, division division was was always there. I mean, you you you know as well as I do

that part of what's been uh fascinating and gratifying about the uh the the arguments on on the right over the last

decade is that the these are these are extremely diverse uh movements where there's been a a great deal of of

openness on many different subjects. The nationalist conservatives have always had internal internal disagreements on

issues like appropriate foreign policy. You know, we're we're united in thinking that the global liberal empire, if you

can call it that. Uh the the the idea that uh America has to be the world's policeman and uh to to uh engage in

conflict in every corner of the world in order to uh to spread liberalism. that's obviously been extremely

controversial and and everyone on the nationalist right uh is skeptical of of uh those uh those old uh in liberal

internationalist policies. But the question of whether the United States um should become, you know, kind of like a

pacifist nation, a country that uh that does not support wars and does not get involved with wars at all. Well, that

that question has come to a a head in the last few months. And uh look, there's there's always been different uh

different schools on this. One school um we could call it the uh the Trump doctrine school uh advocated by thinkers

like Michael Anton and myself and others. Uh the the Trump doctrine uh as it was discussed in 20 in

in 2018, 2019 and and going forward was not a doctrine of pacifism. It was a doctrine of building up regional allies

in different places of the world and uh allowing them the freedom to uh to protect their own interests and in so

doing to protect American and western interests. So the this discussion has been uh not just with respect to Israel

but with respect to the UK to Poland, India, Australia, Japan, maybe Greece. the that there there are plenty of

countries in the world that either have the ability or have potentially have the ability to play the role of taking care

of security threats, serious security threats within their own regions and uh so uh although Tucker Carlson and I uh

would agree that the United States is overextended that it can't afford uh financially and morally in terms of

the the public support within within the country. The United States cannot protect every every uh country in the

world, every region in the world uh against predators against the Russians, against Islamic radicalism against

China. The United States can't do that. But uh where Tucker and I would uh it seems disagree is uh over the question

of whether the United States has any kind of interest in supporting regional allies as they make their regions uh

safer for Western and American interests. So there there is a there is a a very serious disagreement about it.

The the issue is issue is important and it's substantive. I'm sorry that it's um that it's reached the degree of acrimony

and uh and you know mudslinging that it it has reached but obviously uh this is uh it's a very important issue for

everybody. I guess what people some of them are are worried about is that it all feels a little bit sort of 2003. I

mean there is talk of regime change explicitly from some in the Israeli administration.

You know what would the result be of toppling the Iranian regime? We've learned now to be careful what you wish

for after the disasters of Iraq. Would it lead to breaking up of the country? Would it lead to civil war? Would it

lead to mass amounts of immigration into Europe? Would would it lead to a vast oil conflict that would crash the global

economy? Why are they wrong to fear that we're just looking like we're about to repeat the mistakes of that period?

First of all, people the people who are worried about that are right. I mean, I I personally am not the kind of person

who bangs the drum for American military involvement. You you I I I've never I never called for or supported uh

American military action in Iraq or in Afghanistan for regime change in Egypt uh or or or or even even in in in Serbia

or much less places like Ukraine. I'm very skeptical uh as is much of the nationalist right. uh of most of this in

fact the the the the entire theory of the United States uh ruling the world through regime change operations by

force. So I I I I I understand these worries and I agree to them. Um with with respect to there have been voices

in the Israeli government speaking about regime change. I think people are right to be worried about it, but I don't I

don't think that um that the Israeli uh internal debate is similar to the American or even the European internal

debate. When Israelis talk about uh topping toppling the regime of the Ayatollas, they are not talking about uh

occupying militarily with ground forces, occupying the nation of Iran. They're not talking about attempting to impose

uh liberal democracy on the nation of Iran through an occupation of decades. None of these things cross the minds of

any of the Israeli decision makers. Well, apparently they were talking about an assassination attempt on the Supreme

Leader, which would be about as provocative a central move against an administration as as you could make. But

these are two different things. It's one thing to talk about uh look I you know I'm I'm not the decision maker and I'm

not advocating for the for the assassination of Kame but it's very important if you want to understand

what's uh what is being said and thought about in Israel then it's important to understand that the entire uh complex of

ideas that are associated with the neoconservative regime change operations in Iraq Afghanistan Libya and Egypt and

so on that entire complex of ideas is not endorsed by any party in the Israeli political system or or military. that

the Americans do have this problem that that they think some sections, some factions of the American p public uh

public uh discourse do in fact think in terms of uh will go in and will occupy Iran and will

you by force of of of weapons and willpower and the incredible brilliance of our enlightenment liberal ideas, we

will turn Iran into a liberal democracy. There's no one in the state of Israel who endorses this kind of policy. No

one, not Natao, not the general staff, none of the political parties in Israel. So although the the goal of the Israeli

operation is uh elimination of the nuclear program, not regime change, and this is it's it's important to say this

that when President Trump says that the goal is to for Iran not to have a bomb, and Trump has said this many times, if

it can be done by diplomacy and negotiation, we'll do it by diplomacy and negotiation. If it can't, then we'll

do it another way. All right. So that that is in fact the correct policy and that's also Israel's policy. Uh if the

Trump administration uh steps forward in the coming days with a uh in the coming hours possibly with a new Iranian

proposal and the Iranians are willing to uh commit to the dismantling of their nuclear program and their ballistic

missiles program. If that is on the table, then uh Israel would be happy. Israelis would be happy.

it it's unlikely because of the nature of our enemy that you know this this possibility

uh was open not just you know in the last few months uh of Trump diplomacy for 20 years there have been attempts uh

by western governments by the Americans the British the French and others to to attempt to bring Iran to this kind of a

position and it it's it's it's failed and it's it's it's it's brought the Iranian regimem regime to to the brink

of destruction, but it doesn't change our values. We're not we're not interested in having this war. We're

interested in Iran uh Iran not having a nuclear weapons program. I I wonder if this moment is quite a decisive one also

for your movement because it's become almost a global movement. It began. You are the figurehead of I would say the

national conservatism movement and there are now national conservatism conferences in the United States, in

Europe, here in London. It has become a global movement, but it's, as I understand it, correct me if I'm wrong,

it's predicated on the idea that national self-interest is a virtuous thing and we should not be ashamed of

it. That all makes sense until a moment like this where you're sitting in Jerusalem and you've been kept up all

night by sirens and your national self-interest is much more clear in terms of at least what what the Israelis

believe their national self-interest is as regards Iran. But people sitting in Washington DC, many of them don't feel

like this is part of the United States self-interest. So I'm I'm I'm wondering if this becomes a crisis for the global

national conservatism movement where suddenly everyone's interests aren't aligned anymore. I don't really see it

as a crisis. The beauty of the nationalist theory, the beauty of it always was that unlike liberalism and

unlike Marxism, it doesn't claim to be able to dictate a one clear answer that fits everyone everyone at every time and

place in history. It's not a utopian political theory. It's a much more realistic political theory which uh

assumes that the reason that we need to have a world of independent nations, the reason that we need uh the concept the

principle of national independence is because it's impossible for the you know the the the count countless nations and

peoples of the world to uh always have the same interests. So that that's that's baked into the cake. If you want

there to be one uniform answer to political questions, then you're attracted to, you know, the these

theories of world liberal government or world Marxist revolution. Of course, they they they also don't come to uh to

to to one concrete answer. That's the utopian part of the theory. But th this is what's good about nationalism is that

the Americans should not have identical views of their interests from 7,000 miles away to the the Jews living in the

state of Israel. Uh we're not going to have the same interests, which means that sometimes we'll disagree and

sometimes we'll argue and uh there'll be give and take and we still don't know whether the Americans are going to

decide to join in this war or not. But either way, the tremendous thing that I I I I really would like to to to give

President Trump credit for the tremendous positive thing that's happening. The state of Israel has been

endangered by Iran's nuclear program for two decades. Uh beginning in 2010 uh under President Obama uh the state of

Israel has repeatedly reached the point that a wall-to-wall left and right coalition in Israel agreed that is

Iran's nuclear program has to be taken out. in 2010 we have the first instance of many in which President Obama

suppresses by threats the uh Israel's uh attempt to defend itself and and this is not this is not an a reasonable in my

view a we reasonable way uh for for nations to govern the relations between them. America cannot have the same

interests as Israel at all times. And that means that Israel like like the UK in Eastern Europe. It may be that the

the UK will decide that that you know, I'm not recommending this, but it's possible that the UK will decide uh that

its interests require British military military deployments in Ukraine. And and the Americans will say that's not that's

not in our interests. uh but having a president like President Trump who will say look different countries have

different interests you need to look out for your interests first as you see them that I mean that's the nature of

democracy is your people will see its interests in a certain way and your government will honor and and take

seriously the interests of the English or the British people that that's that's the kind of world we

we would like to see wearing your American at do you understand those who think that

big picture America's most important interest is in containing China. This is the view held by people like Elbridge

Colby who is now in the Trump administration is even people who are from a very different political

viewpoint like John Mesheimer who we spoke to earlier. The view there is that there is too much

entanglement in Europe with regard to Ukraine and there is too much entanglement in the Middle East and that

if for America to protect its most important interest it needs to focus its energy on China and therefore big

picture they may take the view that they do not want to get entangled in this Iran Israel conflict. Do you understand

that kind of estimation of America's interests? for sure my views of uh American policy are are almost identical

to bridge col I I consider him to be a good friend but with respect to China I I I completely agree with him and I've

I've I've written this many times that America is the only power in the world that is capable of facing uh the the

threat that all of us face uh from an expansionist and and and brutal Chinese regime.

He's absolutely correct that the United States needs to focus on it. Um that's part of the Trump doctrine is that uh

that the Brits and the Europeans can and should be focused on security in Europe. Uh and uh Israel and its allies uh in in

in the Middle East can and should be focused on Iran and America's focus should not be on Iran. on this. I

completely agree with people like like Tucker Carlson who say that an American regime change operation in Iran to to

invade Iran and and take it over and try to reshape it for 10 or 20 years. This would be catastrophic for the United

States. The United States has look it it has to have a foreign policy. I I don't buy that America can, you know, can just

be this sort of pacifist country behind its oceans. But bridge is right that the United States has to focus its foreign

policy on China and uh with respect to the Middle East, the United States should support the emergence of powerful

allies that can take care of business here in the Middle East without without pulling the United States into it. So my

understanding of what you've said as a way of kind of squaring nationalism with America possibly being

involved in in a conflict so far away is that you would like to see us move to a kind of regional security structure

where there would be a strong country or group of countries in each region that basically run it or or look after the

security of it. And what you're suggesting is that the United States will look after the the North American

region or the region it's in. Europe should look after Europe. And what Israel should look after the Middle East

or how does that work? Is Israel strong enough on its own to kind of run that entire region? First of all, America is

not is is not at this stage of history going to become a regional power. America. When I when I say that

America's first priority has to be uh meeting the threat with China, that that's that's not regional. That that is

a a much larger mission than uh than the UK or Israel or any of the other American allies can take responsibility

for the the idea is that the UK and Israel uh and our allies should be able to take care of other regions in order

to free up the Americans to deal with China. That was respect to Israel's position in the region. I actually think

that the signs of a regional security structure are already well underway and in place. uh the first Trump

administration uh working with Netanyahu were able to with with the Abraham Accords to for the first time bring

about the kind of uh the the beginning of the kind of architecture that would would bring uh uh Jews and Arabs

together uh in uh defending the region against two major forces that threaten threaten this region. I'm leaving uh

China aside for a moment. the the the major security concerns in our region are from uh radical Islam and there's

two different versions of it. There's the uh the Iranian version and there's the Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim

Brotherhood is backed by by uh Turkey and Qatar. Uh Iran uh mostly backs uh uh Shiite organizations like

the like the Houthis and the former Assad regime was aligned with that. But uh but Iran also has its fingers in in

in the Muslim Brotherhood as well. Those are the major threats to every regime uh in in this region to Israel, to the Gulf

States, to Egypt, Jordan. Uh all of us face that threat. part of the goal, part of uh Netanyahu's goal in uh defanging

Iran, in removing the threat of a nuclear Iran is to pave the way for peace between Israel and uh and

countries like uh like Saudi Arabia that have not uh not yet joined the Abraham Accords. Syria is, you know, in theory a

possible example, although not clear that the regime there really is capable of that kind of thing, but we will see.

So the beginnings of a regional architecture, security architecture are there. It's almost paradoxically you'd

argue then that America to be involved in so far as it's facilitating this new architecture into being perhaps some

alliance between Israel, Saudi, some other Gulf states that are friendly to Western regimes to to keep the long-term

security of that area is actually a form of extrication from the region. For sure. Look, this is something that I I

think should be obvious, but unfortunately, you know, all those decades of liberal internationalist

arguments from from uh from uh Americans and from from many in the EU have have clouded the n the the nature of

international power politics. Um, no nation has infinite resources. It can't be everywhere. It's ridiculous. I mean,

I I know Bill Clinton used to talk like that, you know, where every where we're everywhere. But in in reality, resources

are always limited. Even a vast country like the United States has limited resources. And it's not just a matter of

uh of uh limited financial resources or limited willpower to send your your sons and daughters to go die on the other

side of the planet in wars that don't directly affect you. It it's not just that. political leaders also have and

and by the way about this Tucker Carlson is correct that American government has limited attention that the president of

the United States he he may have hundreds of staffers it doesn't matter it it is limited by nature by human

nature limited cognitively in the number of issues that it can deal with the possibility that America should be able

to take a you know an endless festering problem like uh uh like uh Red Sea piracy the the freedom of shipping in in

in uh in the Red Sea and the Straits of Hormuz and and the Gulf of Aden. All of these are are things that weigh on the

American security mind and it's not necessary. there there are powers in this region that you can imagine in in

my in my new version of the expanded version of the virtue of nationalism. There's a a discussion of this Red Sea

problem, the liberal internationalist theory that America America is responsible for the Red Sea. Well, that

that's utopian. That's ridiculous. The Americans they can't be everywhere. Um, but also the the, you know, this sort of

pacifist view that says, "No, America doesn't have to care at all what happens in the Red Sea because that's 7,000

miles away from us." That's also ridiculous. What you mean that that if American

interests are endangered in the Red Sea, then the the only answer is that the United States needs to be able to to

deploy to the Red Sea unilaterally and take care of it. I mean, that's just as ridiculous a view as the as the liberal

internationalist one. You end up in the same place that the United States is ultimately responsible for securing its

shipping in the Red Sea. The the the sane alternative, the only common sense alternative is there are other powers in

this region. There's Israel and the Gulf States. There's Ethiopia. There's Greece. There's India. among these

nations, we we ought to be able to put together with with some effort an appropriate resolution of uh ensuring

the safety of of American and other shipping in this this part of the world. And of course, America should be

interested in that kind of uh of a coalition, but not because America has to govern that coalition to run it

itself. That that that makes no sense. The whole idea of the Trump doctrine is that America can focus its attention on

domestic issues and on the the the security threat of of of arising China and allow these other conflicts to be

resolved by regional players. Yoram Hzani, thank you so much for your time. My pleasure. Thanks there to Professor

Yoram Hazani. So the two professors we heard from in a sense are complete opposites. One is a staunch critic of

Israel and what he calls the Israel lobby and one is an Israeli was talking to us from Jerusalem. Both of them take

very different views on the wisdom of this conflict and whether it's in Israel's interests or in the United

States interest to get involved. And yet what was interesting is there's almost an overlap in their worldview because

John Mishimer as the ultimate realist is the school of foreign policy he belongs to really thinks that states do act in

their own self-interest. That is the way the world works and that liberal ideals of some kind of international kumbaya

are for the birds. So he is essentially a defender of states acting in their national self-interest. And Yuram Hazani

is the architect of the national conservatism movement. It's been incredibly influential, incredibly

successful in the past few years. And at its heart is in a way the same idea which is that it is virtuous and proper

for countries to act in their own self-interest. So they sort of agree about that fundamental principle, but

they come to completely different conclusions. So John Mishimer believes that although he understands it's in

Israel's self-interest to try to take out the Iranian nuclear program, he thinks a it won't work and b it's more

likely to trigger a wider conflict, drag in the United States against their self-interest and create chaos and make

the world a more dangerous place. So he strongly criticizes the whole adventure. Meanwhile, Yuram Hzani really made quite

an interesting delicate argument which actually showed sympathy with those voices inside MAGA like Steve Van and

like Tucker Carlson who are absolutely dead against the US getting involved in this at all. He showed sympathy with

their principles, but he was trying to say that paradoxically for the US to help Israel become one of the regional

players that can look after security in the Middle Eastern area perhaps alongside Saudi, alongside Emirates,

Jordan, various Gulf states. It helps America first according to Yoram Hozani to try and help bring about that

settlement so that in the long term America can focus on its own vital interests. These are delicate judgments

but I thought it was fascinating to hear both sides put forward in such eloquent and interesting ways. As ever you can

make your own mind up. Thanks to them for joining and thanks to you. This was unheard.