LunaNotes

Download Subtitles for XLMRat Lab - Cyberdefenders Video

XLMRat Lab- Cyberdefenders

XLMRat Lab- Cyberdefenders

Hunters4threats

254 segments EN

SRT - Most compatible format for video players (VLC, media players, video editors)

VTT - Web Video Text Tracks for HTML5 video and browsers

TXT - Plain text with timestamps for easy reading and editing

Subtitle Preview

Scroll to view all subtitles

[00:00]

Everyone, I hope everyone is doing

[00:01]

great. So today we'll do a quick lab by

[00:04]

Cyber Defenders which is called the XLM

[00:08]

rat lab. This lab is intended to test

[00:10]

our network forensics skills. So we'll

[00:13]

be given a pickup file to analyze and

[00:16]

deduce what can we get best and extract

[00:19]

the things to answer the questions. All

[00:22]

right. So let's start by reading the

[00:24]

scenario. Obviously, I already did the

[00:27]

lab, but let's do it together for the

[00:29]

sake of practice. The scenario says, "A

[00:32]

compromised machine has been flagged due

[00:34]

to suspicious network traffic. Your task

[00:37]

is to analyze the pickup file to

[00:39]

determine the attack method. Identify

[00:41]

any malicious payloads and trace the

[00:43]

timeline of events. Focus on how the

[00:46]

attacker gained the access, what tools

[00:48]

or techniques were used, and how the

[00:50]

malware operated postcom. All right. So

[00:53]

of course obviously after you download

[00:55]

the pickup file you'll be given with the

[00:57]

password here for the file. I've already

[01:00]

downloaded it. So you can sign it in

[01:03]

downloads. All right let's paste the

[01:06]

password

[01:08]

and right. All right. So here's the pick

[01:11]

a file and so

[01:14]

let's start by answering the questions.

[01:19]

All right. Uh the question says the

[01:22]

first question say the attacker

[01:23]

successfully executed a command to

[01:26]

download the first stage of the malware.

[01:28]

What's the URL from which the first

[01:30]

malware stage was installed? All right.

[01:32]

So since we have a URL involved so we'll

[01:37]

look for HTTP uh packets to look for any

[01:42]

kind of malicious URLs. All right. HTTP.

[01:47]

All right. So here we got four packets.

[01:50]

Okay. XLM text. Okay. Let's look at the

[01:53]

first one

[01:55]

hypertext. Okay. As you can see we have

[01:58]

this one request URL XLM.txt.

[02:02]

The second packet we have um a 200

[02:06]

response code for the http 45.126.xmlm.

[02:12]

Okay. And we have the third one which is

[02:15]

an image GPG file. And we have a full

[02:18]

request. All right. So this seems

[02:20]

suspicious. So we can follow the HTTP

[02:23]

stream or TCP stream. Um sorry, follow

[02:29]

TCB stream. All right. So as you can see

[02:31]

here, this is the client and this this

[02:34]

is the client and this is the service.

[02:36]

Service accepted 200. Okay. And we can

[02:39]

see here some malicious kind of uh hex

[02:42]

uh strings. All right.

[02:46]

Okay. Okay.

[02:49]

And we can see here some kind of a

[02:52]

malicious um PowerShell scripts. All

[02:54]

right. So we can assume that this is

[02:57]

indeed the malicious URL or host. So

[03:01]

which is of course under

[03:04]

uh yeah this is the IP. This is the

[03:08]

port. All right. So we can find the URL.

[03:11]

So it's the third packet. So just to

[03:13]

recap this is the yeah this is the URL

[03:17]

of the third packet that we have found

[03:19]

which is 45.126.209

[03:23]

MDN.gb. Okay so this is the answer

[03:26]

because we indeed found the malicious uh

[03:30]

payload or malware. Okay

[03:33]

this is it. So what's the hosting

[03:35]

provider owns? Which hosting provider

[03:38]

owns the associated IP address? All

[03:40]

right.

[03:41]

We can easily just copy the IP address

[03:45]

and we can go to any website like uh

[03:48]

abuse IP or you can go to geoloccation

[03:51]

IP. All right, there's a lot of ways to

[03:54]

know the IP service provider or general

[03:58]

information about the IP. All right, so

[04:00]

let's paste to the IP.

[04:03]

As you can see here, we have some

[04:05]

general information, city, country, the

[04:08]

domain. So the internet service provider

[04:11]

ISP is related to reliable site.net LLC.

[04:15]

All right. So this is indeed the answer

[04:18]

service provider. So as you can see here

[04:21]

down scroll down it's indeed

[04:23]

reliable.net. All right. Coming to the

[04:26]

third question. I don't want to see I

[04:28]

don't want you to see the answer for the

[04:29]

sake of practice but let's answer. Okay.

[04:31]

By analyzing the malicious Oh my bad.

[04:35]

Okay.

[04:37]

By analyzing the malicious scripts, two

[04:40]

payloads were identified. A loader and a

[04:42]

secondary executable. What's the SH 256

[04:46]

of the malware executable? All right.

[04:49]

So, um as you can see when we came to

[04:52]

the third bucket,

[04:56]

okay, which is indeed this one and we

[04:59]

followed the TCP stream. Of course, as

[05:02]

you can see, this is the first payload

[05:05]

hex string. If you go down, down,

[05:11]

there's possibly another one because we

[05:14]

have a loader and an executable. But as

[05:18]

you can see, it's in the hex,

[05:21]

right? All right. Down, down, down.

[05:24]

So, this all belongs to the first

[05:27]

executable

[05:30]

and the second will belong to the

[05:31]

loader. So you see just can speed up the

[05:34]

process by

[05:43]

all right so as you can see here we have

[05:46]

another string hex string p so we'll

[05:49]

copy the first one

[05:52]

all right and we'll try to decode it

[05:54]

using sites like

[05:58]

um cyber chief but first let me copy it.

[06:02]

All right. Still here.

[06:05]

Copy. All right. And then you go to

[06:07]

sites like

[06:10]

Cyper Chief.

[06:13]

All right. And try to decode it.

[06:18]

So this is the file. All right. And what

[06:22]

you can see from hex. All right. From

[06:25]

hex. And all right. As you can see this

[06:28]

is the hex. Um, we can I don't think

[06:31]

there's an option for SH 256 because

[06:34]

they're looking for 256. So, what we can

[06:36]

do, we just find the MD5,

[06:41]

right? After we find the MD5, of course,

[06:45]

this is the MD5 uh uh, you know,

[06:48]

version. First, let me try something.

[06:53]

There's no difference, but just in case.

[06:59]

All right. bake. All right. So, this is

[07:01]

the MD5 hash for the executable. What we

[07:05]

can do, we can go to virus total and we

[07:09]

can extract the we can extract the shot

[07:15]

56 from the as you can see this is the

[07:18]

executable

[07:20]

details the shot 56

[07:23]

EB7. Okay. So, this is the shot 256 for

[07:26]

the executable. Okay. So indeed this is

[07:30]

indeed the answer as you can see one

[07:33]

EB7B7. Okay sorry.

[07:37]

All right. So all right uh question

[07:39]

number four says what's the malware

[07:41]

family based on Alibaba which is the

[07:43]

Alibaba vendor. So as you can see here

[07:46]

when we are back in virus total can go

[07:49]

to detections and take a look at Ali

[07:52]

cloud. We're looking for Alibaba

[07:55]

right. So

[07:57]

yeah uh Alibaba Ali cloud a synrat. All

[08:02]

right. So here it says it's labeled

[08:05]

Alibaba. Yeah Alibaba. It's labeled as a

[08:08]

synrat. All right. So this is the name

[08:11]

of the malware family that this

[08:14]

executable is related to. So and indeed

[08:17]

as you can see the answer here is a

[08:20]

synchro. Okay. Question number five says

[08:22]

what's the timestamps of the malware

[08:24]

creation? So all the all this kind of

[08:27]

information you can find from uh you

[08:29]

know the details of uh you know visal

[08:33]

can go here history creation time 2023

[08:36]

10:30. So this is indeed the answer.

[08:41]

Okay even the the time and minutes are

[08:43]

mentioned. Question number six says

[08:46]

which LOL bin which is living offline

[08:49]

binaries is leveraged for sales process

[08:52]

execution in the script provided and

[08:56]

provide the full path. All right. So

[08:58]

lobin are usually abused by attackers

[09:01]

because they are legitimate services

[09:03]

that running on the windows. So what we

[09:05]

can do sorry I closed the

[09:09]

I closed the okay back to our package.

[09:12]

So back to our uh you know packet packet

[09:17]

number three which is related to the

[09:18]

malware and we'll go to the payload DCB

[09:21]

stream. So as you can see this is the

[09:23]

payload

[09:25]

as you can see you know we we found some

[09:30]

malicious PowerShell script in the

[09:31]

beginning. So as you can see here you

[09:34]

know reflection assembly okay

[09:39]

partial script you know it's trying some

[09:42]

hide execution policy by so we're

[09:45]

looking for something related to loins

[09:47]

you know which are the legitimate window

[09:49]

service that are abused by attackers

[09:50]

like run DLL right uh

[09:54]

but you can see

[09:58]

okay

[10:01]

All right. All right. So here you can

[10:04]

see here get type get made execute. As

[10:07]

you can see here we can see that this is

[10:10]

kind of obfuscation which are used by

[10:12]

attackers to you know evade detection.

[10:15]

So yeah as you can see you're using the

[10:17]

net framework. Okay the rig is f.xe. All

[10:21]

right. So this is the lin that is being

[10:23]

abused by attackers. All right. So so

[10:26]

this this kind of uh this is just used

[10:28]

for aiscation. So the answer is will be

[10:31]

actually this whole this whole line will

[10:34]

be the answer. So we just need to remove

[10:36]

the the square signs a hash trick. All

[10:40]

right. So as you can see the answer is

[10:43]

indeed Windows Microsoft net framework

[10:46]

reg.x. Yeah. So yeah as you can see the

[10:49]

attack use to um you know event

[10:53]

detection and if you secure the code.

[10:56]

Question number seven says the script is

[10:58]

designed to drop several files. All

[11:00]

right. List the name of the files

[11:02]

dropped by the script. So as you can see

[11:04]

we have like I think more than one more

[11:07]

than one file right. So if we go back to

[11:10]

the payload. All right. As you can see

[11:12]

we can see things like what kind we

[11:16]

should understand you know what kind of

[11:17]

uh activities does you know this payload

[11:20]

does or this Mario does. As you can see

[11:22]

write all text user public content. So

[11:24]

it's trying to drop this file this

[11:27]

PowerShell PS1 content PS1. All right.

[11:32]

Another one

[11:34]

content. PS1

[11:36]

we have here IO file write all text

[11:39]

content.bat battle file. So we have a

[11:42]

PS1 file a PowerShell and a bat file.

[11:45]

Okay. What else? Okay. Content.bat.

[11:49]

All right.

[11:51]

Okay. We have also a VBS file.

[11:54]

Okay. Write all text content content.

[11:57]

VBS. All right. So

[12:00]

as you can see run scripts every two

[12:02]

minutes. Okay. So this is it created

[12:05]

schedule task uh for persistence.

[12:08]

Okay. All right. So contact VBS. All

[12:11]

right. So this is like we found three uh

[12:15]

files that he that the malware drops

[12:17]

when it gets executed. So indeed the

[12:19]

answer is what we have mentioned

[12:22]

content.vps VPS and the PS1 file and the

[12:25]

bat file. So, I hope this live, you

[12:27]

know, was informational and good for the

[12:30]

sake of practice. I hope you enjoyed.

[12:32]

See you on the next video.

Download Subtitles

These subtitles were extracted using the Free YouTube Subtitle Downloader by LunaNotes.

Download more subtitles

Most Viewed

Download Subtitles for 2025 Arknights Ambience Synesthesia Video

Download Subtitles for 2025 Arknights Ambience Synesthesia Video

Enhance your viewing experience of the 2025 Arknights Ambience Synesthesia — Echoes of the Legends by downloading accurate subtitles. Perfect for understanding the intricate soundscapes and lore, these captions ensure you never miss a detail.

Download Subtitles for Girl Teases Friend Funny Video

Download Subtitles for Girl Teases Friend Funny Video

Enhance your viewing experience by downloading subtitles for the hilarious video 'Girl Teases Friend For Having Poor BF'. Captions help you catch every witty remark and enjoy the humor even in noisy environments or for non-native speakers.

تحميل ترجمات فيديو الترانزستورات كيف تعمل؟

تحميل ترجمات فيديو الترانزستورات كيف تعمل؟

قم بتنزيل ترجمات دقيقة لفيديو الترانزستورات لتسهيل فهم كيفية عملها. تعزز الترجمات تجربة التعلم الخاصة بك وتجعل المحتوى متاحًا لجميع المشاهدين.

離婚しましたの動画字幕|無料で日本語字幕ダウンロード

離婚しましたの動画字幕|無料で日本語字幕ダウンロード

「離婚しました」の動画字幕を無料でダウンロードできます。視聴者が内容をより深く理解し、聴覚に障害がある方や外国人にも便利な字幕付き動画を楽しめます。

Download Accurate Subtitles and Captions for Your Videos

Download Accurate Subtitles and Captions for Your Videos

Easily download high-quality subtitles to enhance your video viewing experience. Subtitles improve comprehension, accessibility, and engagement for diverse audiences. Get captions quickly for better understanding and enjoyment of any video content.

Buy us a coffee

If you found these subtitles useful, consider buying us a coffee. It would help us a lot!

Let's Try!

Start Taking Better Notes Today with LunaNotes!