Understanding the Developmental State: Economic Growth and Political Economy Insights

[Applause] so my first question is what are you all doing here I don't know why you're why

you're here but that's it's great to see to see so many faces so first of all let me say that this is actually a world

premiere I've never presented this book I wrote it and now I have to figure out how to say it and and that's been

actually surprisingly challenging because this isn't actually a standard piece of empirical research where I can

say here's my hypothesis here my findings it's really almost like an intellectual history of a group of

people who are grappling with questions of late development and came to a set of somewhat similar answers to a very

particular question this wasn't a group of people who came at this with a theory I don't think it's a group of people who

were interested in why Japan Korea and Taiwan had grown extremely rapidly and to a certain extent why that model

extended also to Hong Kong Singapore in Southeast Asian cases in differing degrees so that was the that was the

local knowledge piece of this but I think the reason that this literature on the developmental state has had a

certain half-life is because it engaged some really fundamental debates about the relationship between the state and

the market and one thing that I think I added in this book is that also engaged some quite fundamental issues about

political economy and the way we think about institutions and long-run growth because the East Asian cases were in

many ways quite anomalous from the perspective of neoclassical institutionalism that emphasizes things

like property rights and and rule of law and contracting and the sort so that's a first set of preliminary marks the

second set of preliminary remarks is that this this work was really geared and looking back at things that happened

even in the 50s in Japan in the 60s and about the time that that this work was coming out the developmental state

actually was starting to diminish in scope and so this was a backward-looking literature that as it

was coming out was in a way becoming obsolete but then the global financial crisis hit and people started to become

concerned about the middle income trap and many of the ideas of this literature then resurfaced because it was

recognized that something like industrial policy and state capacity actually managed were important for for

long-run growth so that's my my kind of overview and the next thing I want to say is that you guys are very much more

snazzy with respect to your your slides and I am mine look doll compared to this but I didn't have anything to do with

this this is I should also tell you it's currently free at Cambridge University Press website so if you want to download

a PDF of this until February 14th you can do it it's a short book it's about thirty five thousand words but let me

let me just give you a brief tour of the book and then go into some more details so one of the things I did I noticed in

writing this book is that some of the ideas that motivated the people who are engaged in the debate about the

developmental state actually had this much longer heterodox origin and so I decided to add a chapter in this book

that discussed a precursors going back and reading for example Alexander Hamilton's report on manufacturers which

I'll talk about very briefly which is just an unbelievable piece of political economy if you've never had a chance to

look at it and I'll talk a little bit about some of that heterodox tradition and what they were preoccupied with and

some differences among some Asian political economists that were looking at these questions and then I'm going to

divide the rest of the talk into a discussion of some of the economic foundations of the of the developmental

state concept and then look at the politics which was the part of this debate that I was engaged in and then

about this fall and return of developmental ISM that I talked about and close with some comments on method

and let me just preview those briefly I know I'm going on with a lot of setup but you know the development economics

profession in the United States has gotten very preoccupied with the problem of causal identification and causal

identification is increasingly itself identified with experimental designs and one of the things I want to you to walk

away with is that the study of cases and local knowledge can also be associated with causal inference and it's

interesting that both the developmental state people and their detractors drew very heavily on case study work in

drawing conclusions about the causes of long-run growth and I'll point out that that was true of the neoclassical types

as well as the developmental state type so when I talk about a heterodox lineage what I mean are our economists that

generally have operated outside of what we would call a liberal or neoclassical tradition with respect to growth and

I'll talk a little bit more about what that I see that in tailing but it's interesting that a key feature of this

heterodox tradition is that the growth of late comers has to be understood in an international context because the

pattern of growth that they will move through is influenced by the fact that they're early comers that basically have

technologies from which they can benefit but they are also operating in international environments in which open

the openness in the economy has added potentially adverse effects on them and their ability to industrialize and so I

mentioned Hamilton's report on manufacturers which some of you may have seen Hamilton the musical but I mean

this guy was just brilliant this is basically a study of import substituting industrialization

in the United States I mean what Hamilton says is there's no way we can industrialize if we leave the American

market opened a British manufactured exports we need to engage in protection subsidies and the creation of the

national banking system that will permit us to support industry I mean it's really striking so there are these these

kind of precursors but I spent some time looking at one particular article which if you haven't if you're not familiar

with it I'll give you lots of reading suggestions during this lecture but if you haven't read Gerson Cron's

economic doctrine as' and historical perspective it's really an extraordinarily prescient piece because

Gershon cross version law basically makes the the set of arguments about late comers that I've talked about and

emphasizes these advantages of being able to absorb technologies but he also argues that you have to have the

institutional capabilities in the late comers to do that and he identifies banking organizations and the state

itself as crucial players in that in that process and he looks at Russia for example and says there's no way that the

private sector would be able to absorb technologies and for Russia to advance in the 19th late 19th and early 20th

centuries without the state intervening so this idea that late comers would have to draw on other organizational and

institutional resources in order to grow over the long run was a quite fundamental idea and of course in the

post-war period export pessimists and those interested in planning ended up playing a very important role in early

development debates both in the United States and and in Britain I'm thinking for example of singer and prema Shu are

critical to introducing ideas about import substitution in Latin America partly because of concerns about the

declining terms of trade and a whole series of economists many British who contributed to ideas about

planning the way that the state had to play a crucial role in pushing industrialization along you know these

names I haven't read this stuff or reread it for years Newark rosenstein-rodan who was talking about

Eastern Europe Hershman unbalanced growth and of course Nicholas Calder's observation that over the long-run the

growth growth of GDP and growth of productivity was intimately tied with getting on a path of manufacturing of

the growth of manufacturing but the development was tied to the process of industrialization but in the course of

retelling the story one of the interesting voices that came out of Asia that was quite distinctive in this

regard was a a political economist named Kaname a Komatsu who actually was writing as early as the interwar period

and subsequently published in Japanese in English a number of his findings in the post-war period particularly in a

very important article written in 1962 on this process and one of the things that's interesting about a Komatsu

compared to the export pessimists that you saw in africa latin america and south asia is that a Komatsu felt that

looking at japan that in fact developing countries could industrialize by an export-oriented growth trajectory and i

think that was quite distinctive and I don't think akka matza was doing anything more than looking at the

Japanese experience but he was responsible for this idea that many of you have heard of the kind of flying

geese model through which lead countries that is Japan would develop an industrial

and so the ahkamaat Sioux idea always had a regional political economy to it in the sense that industries were passed

down this chain of development but note it also implied that each of these countries each of these levels was

capable of kind of upgrading its capabilities and moving into sectors that were being vacated by the lead

goose which a Komatsu rightly saw for the East Asian region as being Japan and that I think is extremely consequential

because from the outset partly because of endowments the growth trajectory of the East Asian countries beginning with

Japan was very much centered on the export of manufacturers and that export of course being central to the larger

growth process or at least being perceived as part of the larger growth process and I'll talk later about why

exports have an important political consequence because they end up being a disciplining mechanism with respect to

the private sector which is also a piece of this developmental stage okay so let me talk a little bit about the economic

foundations and let me start with the big message and this is sort of me as much as as the as people writing in this

vein but in in looking back at this literature it seemed to me that a kind of common feature of people who are

working this area was to see the development process as fundamentally a set of successive coordination problems

or market failures and but I say coordination problems rather than market failures because they were seen by the

actors as requiring actual coordination among major players in the political economy for those problems to be

resolved and it's that and is on not only market failure but coordination which takes us back to a

state role and as I'll argue not necessarily in picking in winners in a very directive fashion but in organizing

processes of joint learning among the parties that permit these extra these negative externalities and coordination

problems to be resolved and and so I think one mischaracterization of the development of this developmental state

concept is that the state somehow has this omniscient capability to choose things that's not I don't think what

what it was believed was going on but that it did have the capacity to coordinate action among a variety of

market players in ways that were in line with what Justin Lin and others have thought of as dynamic comparative

advantage and that regional context I should add was important in that regard because you could look at Japan and see

what Japan was doing and you can see that there's a prospect of you moving into those activities as they're priced

out in in Japan so the context of this fight was was a revival of what you guys call neoliberal thinking I I think of it

as neoclassical thinking in the 1960s and this was led by a group of well-known economists I'm sure many of

you have heard these names Belliveau Lawson and Kruger Jagdish Bhagwati little skotowski and Scott and basically

these these development economists were looking at both positive and negative models and the negative models were

South Asia particularly for people like jugglers Bhagwati why was India growing so slowly and in Latin America somewhat

unfair because in fact lot of character had grown quite rapidly from the 30s to the

1980s when it got hit by the by the debt crises but they were also looking at individual cases in East Asia and saying

these countries succeeded essentially by liberalizing their trade and exchange rate regimes and you guys are

development people you probably wouldn't be here if you weren't you know that this key proposition that the trade

regime in the exchange rate regime are sort of crucial to long-run growth is central to neoclassical propositions and

they were very much pushing this case and they weren't really relying Arana Cleon theory because we know from

neoclassical growth theory that the what drives growth are factor inputs and it's so it's not clear why a change in your

trader exchange rate regime would generate some long-run change in your growth trajectory but people like a

suite of awesome and bagua tea made the case now anyway that those kinds of trade policy changes could affect factor

inputs across the full range and could also contribute to productivity growth whether that you think those of you are

economists whether you think those arguments are compelling or not I leave to you but but the point I want to make

here is that despite the theory it was really the cases of East Asia that allowed them to make these claims in

this forceful way and it was into that debate where a group of economists had identified liberalizing reforms as the

core of East Asia's growth experience both in Japan Korea and Taiwan that you got the dissidents stepping into the

fray and saying wait a second this picture doesn't look anything like descriptively doesn't look anything like

what you've claimed theoretically to be the case and it's also interesting just as a matter of sociology that the big

contributors to this the where we're sort of Outsiders you know Alice Anson Hajong

a Brit Robert Wade who's at LSE you know Outsiders to kind of mainstream economics and of course Chalmers Johnson

was a political scientist and this Magisterial book MIDI in the Japanese miracle which I just can't recommend

enough this is this is a masterpiece of social science in my view and it's just a stunning work which traces how the

bureaucracy in Japan beginning in the late 20s developed and developed the capabilities and learned how to respond

to the crises that Japan was facing through the articulation and implementation of a complex set of

industrial policies and Johnson is not an economist he focuses mainly on the bureaucracy but it was just a parent to

him that the rapid growth in the post-war period was a function of this prior institutional and bureaucratic

development within Japan which permitted this highly centralized entity many delegated power by the diet to undertake

a set of coordination efforts that resulted in rapid growth through increasing investment and efficiency and

and that it was into that space that others myself included jumped particularly on the economic side these

three big books by Alice Hampton Asia's next Asia's next giant I think it's called about Korea Robert Wade governing

the market and hedging Chong's the political economy of Industrial Policy and you know macro was a part of this

actually because part of the argument was that these strong states were capable of mobilizing resources in a way

that weaker governments weren't so it comported with what Paul Krugman others later did emphasizing the

accumulation part of the story but the real action was in the allocation of resources and the solution to these

coordination problems and this theme of market failure is just a consistent theme across all all three of these

books and others that enter these from this fray which by the way included dissidents within the mainstream like

Joe Stiglitz who is making arguments about the way that the financial sectors in East Asia even though they had

significant intervention were nonetheless long-run efficiency enhanced so this section of the book I'll skip

this um this section of the book just goes through what three of these distinctive coordination problems are

and now I'm not gonna walk through all of them in detail if you're interested you can take a look but they're

basically have to do with coordination failures that have to do with the transition between the agriculture of

the modern sector coordination failures with respect to the financial sector and coordination failures that have to do

with the acquisition of technology where they're just a myriad of problems of asymmetric information between buyers

and sellers and you know under firms and governments in the developing countries because of the difficulties of

appropriating the returns to those investments so Dani Rodrik has a great I gather he was here sometime in the last

year he's just a super smart guy um he has I think one of the best papers on this in 1995 he outlines this little

tree ma you know very simple model of an economy of the traditional and modern sector the modern sector has higher

rates of return in equilibrium but it relies on a whole series of capital and intermediate goods and skilled labor and

technology and unless you've got those input it's not going to function at this

higher equilibrium level and you fall back into a kind of low equilibrium growth path and the only way to overcome

that in Am stands famous expressions which of course drove mainstream economists crazy is that you needed to

get prices wrong because if prices were allowed to clear at prevailing market rates than these fundamental problems of

coordination in the modern sector would go unresolved and this is one place where I want to read just a little bit

from Danny's treatment of this he says from the perspective of an individual investor will not pay to invest in the

modern sector unless others are doing so as well there's a classic collective action problem in other words I'll

invest but not if no one else is investing so the question is how you coordinate right the profitability of

the modern sector depends on the simultaneous presence of the specialized inputs but the profitability of

producing these inputs in turn depends on the presence of demand from a pre-existing modern sector catch-22

right and so the only way you can get around those kinds of bottlenecks is to coordinate these production and

investment decisions in a way that allows the modern sector to to take off another way of putting this leaving this

to the market it won't get done that's and then I just provide some examples of this there's some excellent studies in

both English and Japanese I'm not pretending to read Japanese but on the council for industrial rationalization

in Japan which was formed in 1949 I mean there's deep historical work on this and if you look at that it is it's just out

of the textbook of this idea of there being coordination problems its purchasers of steel saying Steel's too

expensive if you want me to export machinery then you've got to figure out how to lower the prices of steel inputs

because we're not going to be competitive and many essentially orchestrating investments loans

coordination among buyers and sellers in order to get that virtuous cycle going which is which we all know contributed

to this very high growth period in Japan from the mid-50s and this was true in the export sector as well there we have

great Studies on Taiwan on exactly how the shift towards the external market took place there a lot of coordination

issues between different segments of the industry with a you know apparently competing interest and the government

playing roles and coordinating those sectors to maximize the flavor the coordination and the financial sector is

a similar problem of course they're those and I'm sure their development economists among you who see you know

would follow the arguments that liberalization of the financial sector and at this stage I mean nothing more

than setting you know deposit rates adequately to encourage financial intermediation but you know Amsden and

and Stiglitz come along and point out that these financial systems are just totally inadequate to the task of of

providing development finance and Amsden defended development banking exactly stepping into that that breach

but Stiglitz comes along and makes a you know a similarly set of very subtle arguments about the way that reducing

competition limiting deposit rates reverse spreads were we're you know lending rates are below deposit rates

with those subsidies being covered by the government all can contribute to eliciting investment from private

sectors that are otherwise gonna be cautious so you know again this similar kind of mechanism of coordination

playing a role in overcoming these these coordination problems and I think particularly for for Allison's Dhin who

unfortunately died in the last couple of years are quite young at least from someone my age you know the the issues

of Technology and learning were really fundamental here because developing countries are in a position of having to

acquire technologies which they don't understand and then you're having to pay for it and you don't know what you're

paying for because you don't know until you purchase it what it is that you've purchased they're subject to highly

variable path-dependent learning processes which are incredibly difficult to foresee and we all know

that investment in R&D in the developing world is less than it would actively be and so intervention and technology

markets trying to maximize returns to the negotiations that are taking place between domestic purchasers of

technology and foreign sellers restricting foreign direct investment if needed to prevent the exploitation of

those of those rents that are generated by intellectual property protections if all of that was a piece of this growth

story you know if we can approach if we can expropriate the technologies in effect you know all the better for the

developing country's Amsden looked at this in the context of the Korean groups and said

that the groups themselves were the sort of institutions were a lot of this took place but people like Peter Evans and

studies of Singapore talked about how this took place through industrial policy in key industries so you know I

think there's a just spells out in general terms you know the logic the economic logic of this developmental

state thinking and note this isn't about a single mom it's not like the developmental state was an off-the-shelf

model it was more than an identified a set of tasks as Richard doner puts it which states as policy as the locus of

policymaking phase and not only tasks but tasks that involve coordination among actors in order to resolve and so

the state role again is not simply choosing industries but trying to elicit information from the actors themselves

that would permit these problems to be resolved so that's the economic part of this now at the same time and this is

self referential there are a handful of us who are mostly political scientists who are looking at these questions and

asking looking at these problems and asking somewhat different question which is how is it politically that these

countries were capable of pursuing these policies which we know we know and I buy into this are vulnerable to rent seeking

and distortion I mean and I in rereading trebush I was really surprised to see he was

completely aware of this problem he knew that protection ran renze risks and the question of how much protection

for how long how you condition it on performance was something that he is completely aware who's not naive but it

does raise this question of what's the political foundation of this and if there's one small contribution to this

book besides kind of summarizing literature the one brainstorm I had is and realized

that the way that the people working in this tradition thought about political institutions was fundamentally different

than that in the dominant neoclassical institutional paradigm which focuses on property rights contracting rights rule

of law and ultimately through people like berry wine gas in his work on the on the British innovations with respect

to the Parliament checks on executive power and discretion and those of us who look at me Stasia looked at the East

Asian cases and said you've got to be kidding these are countries that are characterized by rule of law there are

Thorat Aryan regimes how can you have rule of law and executive checks when you're ruled by the KMT and puchen he or

even frankly by the LDP as a dominant party over 50 years of Japan's post-war and so the question of of what the

institutional foundations of these things were they just didn't seem to fit the dominant model that if you get

property rights right everything will follow I mean these were systems that in which governments exercised a tremendous

amount of discretion over property rights and so there are basically two kind of approaches that grew out of this

the one which we ovarian s'en was to look at how bureaucracies were incentivized internally in ways that

contributed to the coherence of the making of public policy and so this was really in a way a very micro store

because most of the chapters in Johnson's book are just taken up with these incredible narrative of how MIDI

evolved and who how they train their bureaucrats and who occupied which position and their education and exactly

how the the chain of promotion within the bureaucracy worked in such a way that incentives within the bureaucracy

were very highly focused on doing the right thing not selling office at the other extreme right not corruption and

then the other line of thinking was to start considering what the social foundations of these developmental

states were what were the coalition's in broad terms that that that supported them and in both of those areas there

were some some combinations that were sort of not what we typically expect with respect to both business and labor

and I'll come back to the both of those so I think I've outlined some of the the issues already about the this idea of

the insulation of the bureaucracy incentivizing the bureaucracy creating state capacity investing in resources

this is the kind of thing that Sam is interested in it's one of the reasons I wanted to come up here to talk to to you

guys about you know this whole question of state capacity which is a again a different way of thinking about

institutions then a focus on on checks on property rights I mean that's the Doug North conception of institutions

that's not what these people were talking about they don't want to know if the state is protecting property rights

they want to know is the state capable of delivering on whatever policy commitments it makes that's a different

question and one that you know requires quite different answers you know this isn't about rule of law it's about

getting things done and so you know that raised a big debate about whether authoritarianism played some role in

this I was involved in that debate we can come back to that but I think the point here really is you know that this

issue of how you construct bureaucracies that are you know responsive and so forth has already been made and I won't

go go over it but it really again you know to repeat because I think this is so important it's a conception of

institutions in which capacity figures centrally in what you're trying to accomplish in the process I mean who

thinks of economic reform is building capacity that's not a real liberal conception right it's like you know we

want to reduce capacity and discretion and so this is a very you know kind of contrarian thing now just say a few

words about business and labor because because idea that bowling were obviously right-wing governments two of the three

were authoritarian you know anti-communist repressive of Labor and so you would naturally think that these

were governments that essentially were in bed with the local private sector and what's interesting there is a kind of

arm's length or even hostile relationship between the government and the local private sector and the local

private sector is has to be disciplined and controlled was actually central to each of their

political stories so let me just run through a few so Parchin he comes to power in 1963-64 he immediately

virtually all the leaders of the major Korean on corruption charges all over he

basically just puts him in jail and says I'll let you out of jail as long as you promise to invest in a set of plans

which the military government you know me is going to put on the table and what do

you think they said yeah we're definitely but this is not your NC I mean this is this is an extremely strong

government that that is exercising control over the private sector and use the financial system as those of you

study Taiwan know that the Taiwanese government that is the ROC government was made up almost entirely initially of

mainlanders occupying Taiwan and they're dealing with the private sector of Taiwanese now this is not a close

relationship and aside a British example in Hong Kong you had a colonial government run by the British though it

was totally committed to less affair and uninterested in providing any support whatsoever local private you wanna make

money and I could replicate that with with Singapore Lee Kuan Yew hated the local Chinese private sector I mean he

thought they were backward and so on and went with multinationals is a way of disciplining them so the political

relationship between the private sector and the state in these cases was much more complicated than we typically think

and Alice Amsden talked specifically about the importance of the government disciplining the private sector as a

component of a successful development I said I wouldn't read any more but this is just so great you know this is

classic Alice as their second book big book 2001 book on the rise of the rest she says

control mechanism is a set of institution that imposes discipline on economic behavior it doesn't sound

anything like a neoclassical treatment disciplining economic behavior the control mechanisms of the rest evolved

around the principle of reciprocity subsidies were allocated to make in manufacturing profitable but did not

become giveaways recipients of subsidies were subjected to monitor monitor Bowl performance standards that were

redistributed in nature and results-oriented it's a stick alright you want finance

you know behave yourself and so the idea that the private sector needed to be checked was crucial and incidentally

exports I think the focus on export performance was a part of that disciplining mechanism because it

provided a way to effectively assess the extent to which firms were moving towards the efficiency frontier if you

can't export then don't come to us for us right that's the test and so again the business government relationship was

was sort of fraud and then I'll just say a brief thing about labor subordination because you know everyone recognizes

that this is a piece of the East Asian story I mean that labor was actively repressed in both Korea and Taiwan early

incorporated in somewhat different ways those of you are interested in unions there's some different there's some

nuances and in the way that labor was controlled in those two countries as well as Japan but what's interesting is

at the same time if you look at the path of the East Asian welfare state this idea of a productivist welfare state you

see that early in the development process high investment in primary education then secondary education then

tertiary education this sort of sequence and so you didn't get pre premature investment and tertiary education and

you also had this quite substantial foundation of primary education and literacy prior

to the takeoff right so I mean raises these just you know what all of us I think see is you

know now this is Mother's Milk but you know this idea that social policy with respect to health and education is a

prerequisite for success with respect to industrialization and exports right if wage costs were the driver of foreign

direct investment money would be flowing into Mauritania it's not right and so this whole idea that you know this sort

of strange combination of a repressive stance towards labor politically and then at the same time investment in

human capital that's quite phased is I think a kind of interesting and complex feature of these of these countries okay

so let me let me move ahead I think I've made these points and just talk very briefly about where this all goes and

then wrap up how am i doing in terms of time five minutes yeah that's good so so just as all this work is coming out the

world starts to change trade policy pressures the Asian financial crisis international production networks all of

those appear to reduce the space for conduct of Industrial Policy and I think there was a feeling well maybe you know

this East Asian experience was just a kind of historical blip you know as a result of some permissive geo strategic

and economic conditions but then you have this very influential paper that I'm sure many of you know Gil and Karras

where he's working homey Karras working in the bank he's out talking to people in East Asia and and as 2006 and you're

talking to middle income countries and he's saying well you know you should just keep doing this you know export-led

growth thing based on you know relatively low wages and they're saying this makes no sense where middle income

countries you know and so this whole idea of there being a middle income trap where a relatively small number of

countries have managed to escape from middle-income status you know only thirteen from 1960 to 2008

I think many of you have seen diagrams like this you know which compares income per capita in 1960 with that in nineteen

relative GDP per capita that is your country versus the United States in 1960 and 1980 and the the neoliberal story is

supposed to be about income convergence the poorer you are the more quickly you're going to converge well no you

know look at these countries that are stuck set aside the low income trap issues you know the few number of

countries that sort of escape right and many of them are in East Asia and the European periphery and so what that

brings back is this whole question of how do you put together you know I'm sorry I'm skipping around here I want to

finish what role does technology play in all of this how do you get technology working for development and diffused

what skills are appropriate for middle-income countries you're not just gonna do primary education anymore if

you want to participate in GP ends you need skilled workers you know how do you solve these dilemmas and clearly those

are all coordination problems and then unfortunately rushing a little bit the whole political question of what how you

put together coalition's in support of this so I'm just gonna comment here on this and then I'll wrap up I'm sorry for

running out on Sam first time but you know the the idea here I think that comes out of this literature and the

reason it's revived is not because anyone thinks that in 2019 someone can look at Korea and Taiwan and Japan and

say okay we're gonna do that again you know that's not that's not the issue the question is whether this focus on you

know particular types of institution the building of state capacity and particular coordination problems in the

real and and financial sectors whether that way of thinking about the development process isn't as productive

as thinking about turning the dials of reform you know the standard model and I'm not saying there isn't returned to

liberalisation I'm actually a supporter have you know cautious liberalisation but is that the only way to think about

these processes and I think that the reason this literature has come back is because it's it's posed those questions

and now maybe the issue is not doing at the national level this isn't you know we can't do closed economy industrial

policy anymore but can we do that at the industry level can we do that the regional level you know can we upgrade

within global production networks by bringing these kind of conceptions of coordination and state capacity to bear

on those problems and I think that's what's kept us this traditional line okay I ran on I'm sorry

[Applause]