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Why Does 2 + 2 = 4? What Math Teaches Us About Deep Reality

Why Does 2 + 2 = 4? What Math Teaches Us About Deep Reality

Hoover Institution

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[00:00]

2 + 2 = 4. In all places and for all

[00:06]

time, 2 + 2 equals 4. But why? What does

[00:11]

math tell us about the nature of

[00:13]

reality?

[00:15]

David Berinsky, Sarah Juan, and Steven

[00:18]

Meyer on Uncommon Knowledge. Now,

[00:21]

[music]

[00:34]

welcome to Uncommon Knowledge recording

[00:36]

today in Saltzburg, Austria. I'm Peter

[00:38]

Robinson. David Berlinsky has taught

[00:41]

math, philosophy, and English at

[00:43]

universities including Stanford, Ruters,

[00:45]

the City University of New York, and the

[00:47]

Universary.

[00:49]

I hope you like that pronunciation,

[00:51]

David.

[00:51]

>> Perfect.

[00:51]

>> He is the author of books including one,

[00:53]

two, three, absolutely elementary

[00:56]

mathematics and his fourthcoming volume,

[00:58]

the perpetual rose. A native of Romania,

[01:02]

Sergio Clanerman is a professor of

[01:04]

mathematics at Princeton. In his own

[01:06]

words, his current interests include the

[01:09]

mathematical theory of black holes, more

[01:12]

precisely, their rigidity and stability.

[01:14]

I'm reading these words without having

[01:15]

any idea what they mean. and the dynamic

[01:18]

formation of trapped surfaces and

[01:20]

singularities. Close quote.

[01:24]

I'll ask you to explain a little bit of

[01:25]

that maybe. Sergio, the director of the

[01:28]

discoveries institute center for science

[01:30]

and culture, Steven Meyer, started his

[01:32]

professional life as a geoysicist. He

[01:35]

returned to school earning a doctorate

[01:36]

from Cambridge in the history and

[01:38]

philosophy of science. Uh he has

[01:40]

established himself as one of America's

[01:42]

leading thinkers in intelligent design.

[01:45]

his most recent book, The Return of the

[01:47]

God Hypothesis.

[01:49]

David, Sergio, Steve, welcome.

[01:53]

Um,

[01:54]

in the return of the God Hypothesis,

[01:56]

Steve's latest book, he argues that

[01:59]

three relatively recent developments

[02:01]

suggests that science needs to return to

[02:04]

some notion of the transcendent. And

[02:06]

these three developments are the big

[02:08]

bang, the finetuning of the universe,

[02:12]

and the discovery of DNA.

[02:14]

After reading Steve's book, a certain

[02:17]

very accomplished, well-known

[02:19]

mathematician took Steve aside and said,

[02:23]

"You only named three developments that

[02:26]

suggest a transcendent mind. There's a

[02:29]

fourth." Sergio, what did you mean by

[02:32]

that?

[02:32]

>> Well, first I I should say uh Steve

[02:35]

talked about about developments and uh

[02:39]

mathematics

[02:41]

is forever. I mean has been around for

[02:43]

thousands of years. So it's not quite

[02:45]

fair to compare but uh uh mathematics

[02:50]

has

[02:51]

by definition deals with its own sense

[02:54]

of it's its own reality which is uh I

[02:58]

claim as objective as physical reality

[03:00]

and uh so for example black holes are

[03:03]

like that right a black hole by

[03:05]

definition

[03:06]

>> it it we have a a mathematical theory of

[03:10]

general relativity that predicts black

[03:12]

holes

[03:13]

>> but uh by definition a black hole cannot

[03:15]

be seen. So nevertheless we we can

[03:18]

assert its existence. Why? Because the

[03:20]

general relativity is a consistent

[03:22]

theory.

[03:23]

>> So so could to take this to black holes

[03:25]

scare the daylights out of me. We'll

[03:27]

come back to black holes I'm sure. But

[03:28]

my mind already hurts is just when

[03:31]

hearing about your work on the rigidity.

[03:33]

All right.

[03:34]

In layman's terms, which is to say for

[03:36]

me 2 + 2 equals 4 is real. That's not a

[03:42]

figment. It's not an artifact of our

[03:45]

mind of mental processes of the

[03:46]

accidental processes that might be going

[03:48]

on in our neurons. Whether I think it's

[03:50]

2 plus two equals three or five, I'm

[03:54]

wrong. 2 plus 2 does equal four and that

[03:55]

is objectively real.

[03:57]

>> Correct?

[03:58]

>> Therefore, there is a conceptual

[04:00]

objective reality that exists in outside

[04:03]

us.

[04:03]

>> It's not material.

[04:04]

>> That's not material. And this is

[04:06]

actually a big deal.

[04:08]

>> David shrugs.

[04:10]

>> Um, yeah, of course it's a big I mean 2

[04:12]

plus 2 equals 4 is an interesting

[04:14]

example but you can derive that

[04:17]

biological inference from still more

[04:19]

fundamental ideas which is an exciting

[04:23]

and interesting fact all its own. You

[04:25]

don't have to begin by affirming 2 plus

[04:27]

2 equals 4. There I stand I can do no

[04:29]

other. You can say I've derived that

[04:32]

from still more primitive conceptual

[04:34]

items. But when you go back and back and

[04:37]

back and back and you ask about the

[04:39]

initial assumptions

[04:42]

the axioms of a system about arithmetic

[04:46]

there is no additional defense that you

[04:49]

can offer beyond the consistency of the

[04:51]

whole which is a very interesting

[04:54]

position to find oneself. So I'm going

[04:56]

to quote to you from your book

[04:58]

>> nothing

[04:59]

>> one one two three I think this is the

[05:02]

I'm hoping this is the same point

[05:03]

because that will indicate that I have

[05:05]

actually understood you quote neither

[05:07]

the numbers nor the operations they make

[05:09]

possible permit an analysis in which

[05:12]

they disappear in favor of something

[05:14]

more fundamental. It is the numbers that

[05:18]

are fundamental. They may be better

[05:20]

understood. They may be better

[05:22]

described, but they cannot be bettered.

[05:25]

>> I I still think that's true. Bear in

[05:27]

mind when you say 2 + 2 equals 4, that's

[05:30]

an assertion.

[05:31]

>> Yes.

[05:31]

>> What I'm arguing for in that particular

[05:34]

passage is that when you go back to the

[05:37]

foundations of arithmetic in the

[05:40]

expectation or the hope that you can get

[05:43]

rid of the numbers, you're going to be

[05:46]

very disappointed because they reappear.

[05:49]

All right, I'm going to quote David once

[05:52]

again, but I put this to to the two of

[05:55]

you for judgment. I'm assuming he will

[05:57]

agree with himself. Although in David's

[05:58]

case, this is always a question. Again,

[06:01]

from his book 123, quote, across the

[06:04]

vast range of arguments offered,

[06:06]

assessed, embraced, deferred, delayed,

[06:08]

or defeated, it is only within

[06:10]

mathematics that arguments achieve the

[06:13]

power to compel

[06:16]

>> allegiance. No philosophical theory has

[06:19]

ever shown why this should be so. It is

[06:22]

a part of the mystery of mathematics.

[06:26]

So you argue from some

[06:30]

philosophical point that derived from

[06:32]

Aristotle and has seemed

[06:35]

straight and but I can still say you

[06:37]

know I'm not persuaded but when you say

[06:38]

to me 2 plus 2 equals 4 I have to of

[06:40]

course you're right about that. Is is

[06:42]

that the point? I can speak to this from

[06:44]

the standpoint of someone who's worked

[06:45]

in the natural sciences and as a

[06:47]

philosopher of science. The natural

[06:49]

sciences provide empirical or

[06:52]

observational evidence in support of

[06:54]

conclusions and scientists will evaluate

[06:57]

particular theories or hypotheses by

[07:00]

comparing their explanatory power or

[07:01]

their predictive power. But the logical

[07:04]

form of those arguments is does not

[07:06]

render a deductively certain conclusion.

[07:09]

You in the best of cases will make an

[07:12]

inference to a a hypothesis which

[07:15]

provides the best explanation.

[07:16]

>> Hang on one second. Right. Just

[07:19]

distinguish deduction from inference for

[07:21]

us.

[07:21]

>> So a deductive a deductive uh argument

[07:24]

will start with a major premise. All men

[07:27]

are mortal. A minor premise some fact

[07:30]

about the world. Uh

[07:32]

>> Socrates the man

[07:33]

>> Socrates is a man. And then a

[07:35]

conclusion. Therefore

[07:37]

>> Socrates is immortal. Okay. And if the

[07:39]

premises are true and the reasoning is

[07:41]

valid, then the conclusion can be

[07:43]

affirmed with some kind of with with

[07:45]

certainty. But the uh in in the natural

[07:48]

sciences, you start with facts that

[07:50]

you've observed about the world. And you

[07:52]

want to infer from those facts to either

[07:55]

some kind of generalization that would

[07:56]

be an inductive argument or to some sort

[07:59]

of causal uh process that might explain

[08:02]

what you're seeing around you. Those

[08:04]

arguments are typically u characterized

[08:07]

as abductive. the kind of detective

[08:09]

reasoning that we we enjoy when we watch

[08:12]

detective shows where the yeah Columbbo

[08:14]

or someone's trying to figure out who

[08:16]

done it.

[08:17]

>> Um and so those abductive and inductive

[08:20]

inferences when you examine the logical

[08:22]

forums turn out not to give you

[08:24]

certainty. They may give you

[08:25]

plausibility. They may give you

[08:27]

comparative plausibility where one

[08:28]

theory is very much better than another.

[08:30]

But they don't give you the kind of

[08:32]

certainty that mathematics alone and

[08:35]

mathematical logic can give. A good

[08:37]

scientist will never say any more than

[08:39]

the theory is XYZ and on the best

[08:42]

evidence it holds up for now. Whereas a

[08:44]

mathematician is feels perfectly

[08:46]

confident in saying I've proven I've

[08:49]

proven we've proven it. We have a proof.

[08:51]

>> When you say proof in science the

[08:52]

mathematicians however are better than

[08:54]

we

[08:54]

>> when you say you've proved something you

[08:55]

mean it.

[08:56]

>> Yes.

[08:56]

>> All right. Okay. So this go ahead.

[08:59]

>> It could be wrong but somebody will show

[09:01]

it to me that it's okay. So if this

[09:04]

brings us to Sergio's article in

[09:05]

inference, a magazine that you edit,

[09:08]

David, the

[09:10]

article is entitled reflections on an

[09:12]

essay by Vner.

[09:14]

Now Eugene Vner, I have to set this up,

[09:17]

was a 20th century mathematician and

[09:19]

physicist. In 1960, he wrote a famous

[09:22]

essay, the unreasonable effectiveness of

[09:25]

mathematics in the natural sciences.

[09:28]

Vner noted his surprise that

[09:31]

mathematics, which after all goes on in

[09:34]

our minds, should prove so useful in

[09:36]

describing and even predicting aspects

[09:39]

of the physical world. Okay, can you

[09:42]

give me a couple of examples of this? I

[09:45]

mean, when I when I think to myself,

[09:46]

wait a minute, so I have a dream in the

[09:49]

middle of the night. I wake up and it

[09:50]

turns out it was untrue. But if I do a

[09:53]

mathematical equation and I wake up,

[09:54]

it's still true. is well Sergeu wrote a

[09:58]

brilliant essay and what he showed was

[10:00]

that you can start with very simple

[10:02]

mathematics and build up to more and

[10:04]

more and more complex forms of math

[10:07]

essentially deductively and then those

[10:09]

complex forms of math take the calculus

[10:11]

take differential equations they map

[10:14]

beautifully onto the physical world to

[10:16]

describe actual processes that are

[10:17]

taking place in nature so that they

[10:19]

provide very precise descriptions of

[10:21]

things that are going on in nature and

[10:23]

what Vner is alluding to is mystery that

[10:26]

this or the the puzzle this induces for

[10:29]

a lot of physicists. Why should the math

[10:32]

that we have developed through a series

[10:33]

of deductive steps effectively from our

[10:36]

own reasoning map so beautifully to

[10:39]

processes that we sometimes haven't even

[10:40]

observed yet. And David has a number of

[10:42]

great examples in one 123 of

[10:44]

mathematical structures that were

[10:46]

developed well before they had any

[10:48]

application to to to physics but then

[10:51]

later were were crucial and maybe he

[10:53]

should speak to that.

[10:53]

>> Yes. Well, I mean it's not I mean Eugene

[10:57]

Bner raised a very interesting point and

[11:00]

people have been discussing it. If you

[11:02]

look at theoretical physics, the great

[11:05]

structures, Newtonian mechanics, general

[11:08]

relativity, quantum mechanics, you can't

[11:11]

do it without a lot of mathematics. You

[11:13]

just need a whole lot of mathematics.

[11:15]

And Vignaris, the question is, you know,

[11:18]

we need mathematics to do quantum

[11:20]

mechanics, but we don't need entomology.

[11:23]

How come the bugs don't figure in

[11:24]

quantum mechanics, but the numbers and

[11:26]

the complex numbers do? And that is a a

[11:29]

rewarding and a provocative question.

[11:31]

But we don't have to turn to quantum

[11:33]

mechanics. There's a glass here. There's

[11:36]

a glass here, one glass, one glass. How

[11:39]

many glasses are in front of you? Two.

[11:42]

From where do you derive that assurance

[11:46]

>> that there are two glasses in front of

[11:48]

you? It's not a physical observation

[11:50]

because nothing in the physics of the

[11:53]

situation reveals the fact that one and

[11:55]

one are two. That is something someone

[11:57]

would think that's additional. Now, we

[12:00]

can break that all down into smaller

[12:02]

steps. And that's what logicians have

[12:04]

done in the 20th century. They've shown

[12:07]

us that the method of proof can be

[12:09]

decomposed into very small steps. In

[12:11]

fact, so small a computer can execute

[12:14]

them. And the initial assumptions can be

[12:16]

made so general, in fact so general that

[12:19]

they encompass all of mathematics as in

[12:21]

set theory or categories theory for that

[12:24]

matter. But we are in all this in a

[12:28]

rather an awkward position. I happen to

[12:30]

be looking out at a beautiful alpine

[12:33]

lake now. And just imagine we see

[12:35]

somebody on the other shore who begins

[12:36]

walking across the water without any

[12:38]

assistance whatsoever. He's just

[12:41]

crossing walking one step in front of

[12:43]

the other and he's crossing the light

[12:45]

toward us and he comes completely dry.

[12:48]

He appears in front of the television

[12:50]

camera and we say, "How did you do

[12:51]

that?" And he says, "Well, I took very

[12:54]

small steps.

[12:56]

I took very small steps." Now, our

[12:59]

natural reaction would be that's

[13:00]

commendable and you got across. But

[13:04]

somehow or other, it's not the answer to

[13:06]

the question. And we are all in the

[13:08]

position of watching someone cross a

[13:10]

large bottle body of water and

[13:12]

explaining his success by saying, "Look

[13:15]

at my feet. Small steps." That's where

[13:17]

we are.

[13:18]

>> Okay. So, so Sergio, well, wait, let me

[13:21]

go back to your essay. I'm quoting you

[13:23]

once again. The mystery Vner points out

[13:26]

arises in part from the perennial

[13:29]

question of whether mathematics is a

[13:31]

science advanced by exploration and

[13:34]

discovery like the main physical

[13:36]

theories or whether it is an an

[13:38]

invention a creation of the human mind.

[13:43]

I argue that mathematics developed

[13:45]

through exploration and discovery. That

[13:48]

is to say it is like a nugget in the

[13:51]

ground. You find it

[13:53]

>> correct.

[13:53]

>> It has its own. Okay.

[13:55]

>> Yeah. No, absolutely. I mean, uh,

[14:01]

one image that you could make is that of

[14:03]

an alpineist that is is going trying to

[14:06]

go on the top of the mountain. He has

[14:09]

>> everybody's doing alpine metaphors

[14:11]

today, but

[14:12]

>> he has an idea where he wants to go,

[14:14]

right? So, that's very important. That's

[14:15]

part of doing mathematics. It's not just

[14:18]

>> it's not just deduction. There's sort of

[14:20]

a vision of where you want to go which

[14:22]

is very important.

[14:23]

>> Inspiration,

[14:24]

right? Has something to do with

[14:25]

inspiration. But then then you know you

[14:29]

have something very objective in front

[14:31]

of you, right? The stone is of the

[14:33]

alpinist that you have to take into

[14:35]

account that you you're not going to

[14:37]

fall. You you you

[14:39]

have to touch the stone to know exactly

[14:41]

where you are going and if you don't you

[14:43]

get into trouble. Uh so is very similar.

[14:47]

um people have the feeling that

[14:49]

everything is deductive. It's not. I

[14:51]

mean

[14:53]

it it is uh very similar in that respect

[14:56]

to physical sciences. You physical

[14:58]

sciences also you have some idea of you

[15:02]

you have let's say an expectation uh you

[15:04]

make a hypothesis.

[15:05]

>> Right.

[15:06]

>> Right. The choice of a hypothesis is is

[15:08]

is not a deductive thing. is just a it's

[15:11]

an insight and then uh you try to show

[15:14]

that that it fits everything else all

[15:16]

the other experiences. So uh

[15:18]

>> and that that's the process of proving

[15:20]

something right. So you have the the the

[15:22]

process right you have the process of

[15:24]

discovery but then the process of

[15:26]

justification

[15:26]

>> the process of justification. So

[15:28]

mathematics at the end of the day it

[15:30]

looks like a a chain of logical

[15:32]

sequences that the computer can also I

[15:35]

mean once you you have the chain the

[15:37]

computer can

[15:38]

>> go very fast through it and maybe even

[15:40]

check uh so there are no yet no

[15:43]

computers that can check large

[15:46]

>> I mean they can check small small proofs

[15:48]

but not large in in in any case uh it's

[15:51]

sort of a very good example I think that

[15:54]

illustrates very well relations between

[15:55]

mass and theory take geometry so The

[15:57]

geometry was the first really theory of

[15:59]

the physical world right I mean it's

[16:01]

what it describes

[16:03]

>> going all the way back to Uklid is that

[16:04]

what you

[16:05]

>> it goes back right so Uklid tried

[16:07]

obviously tried to make sort of

[16:09]

mathematical statements out of

[16:11]

>> but it's a physical theory without doubt

[16:13]

including geometry is a physical theory

[16:15]

and then uh it it developed so here it

[16:18]

comes up something specific to

[16:20]

mathematics different from physics

[16:22]

mathematicians can take a theory and

[16:24]

then develop based on

[16:29]

very different criteria than a physicist

[16:31]

will do. So you know they are interested

[16:33]

in in problems because they are

[16:34]

beautiful or because because they uh

[16:39]

they feel that it will lead to certain

[16:41]

understanding of something else and uh

[16:44]

this freedom really in the case of

[16:46]

geometry went for I don't know 2,000

[16:49]

years without essentially no connection

[16:51]

back to the physical world. I mean

[16:54]

geometry was there

[16:55]

>> to start with but then by the 19th

[16:58]

century you have you know have Gaus you

[17:00]

have Robacheski you have Gaus you have

[17:02]

reman uh you have Minkovski at the

[17:05]

beginning of of the 20th century and

[17:08]

then all of a sudden all that stuff

[17:10]

becomes an essential ingredient I mean

[17:13]

it's not just you know it's not just a

[17:15]

technical it's an essential ingredient

[17:17]

of of special and generativity

[17:19]

right so uh

[17:21]

>> comes directly applicable to fundamental

[17:23]

physical theory

[17:24]

>> and I think this has happened many many

[17:26]

times in and maybe it's not very well

[17:30]

it's not very well acknowledged. So can

[17:31]

I ask when you Serguit needless to say I

[17:35]

cannot evaluate your work on my own

[17:38]

because you have done a 2,000page proof

[17:40]

2,000 pages of close mathematical

[17:43]

reasoning. I could have I could live to

[17:45]

2000 and not I could read a page a day

[17:48]

or a page a year and it still would

[17:50]

escape me I'm sure. And this was on the

[17:54]

stability of some aspect of Ein that

[17:57]

Einstein. So may I ask

[18:00]

>> did you think you were doing a work of

[18:02]

art creating something beautiful or did

[18:04]

you think you were interrogating

[18:06]

reality? Do you see that? I'm trying to

[18:09]

understand what you thought what it felt

[18:11]

like to you as a working mathematician

[18:12]

engaged on a

[18:13]

>> it's a very deep very difficult problem

[18:16]

>> and the answer is both. I mean I I I

[18:19]

would take the problem in the first

[18:20]

place. I'm a mathematician. I'm not a

[18:22]

physicist, right? I'm interested in I I

[18:24]

believe that the best mathematics is

[18:26]

connected somehow with physics in in

[18:29]

complicated ways. So uh but there are

[18:32]

many problems in physics and I will pick

[18:35]

the one that satisfies my

[18:39]

aesthetical feeling as a mathematician.

[18:41]

Uh so that's that's a saying

[18:43]

>> your aesthetical feeling. So so so

[18:45]

explain that you want something

[18:46]

>> something that I feel something that I

[18:48]

feel is very beautiful. It's it it it's

[18:50]

very profound. It gives lots of very

[18:52]

interesting questions. Uh okay. So

[18:55]

that's that's one aspect. But then then

[18:57]

it has to be the sec for me at least

[18:59]

there has to be a second aspect which is

[19:01]

that it should say something about the

[19:03]

physical world and in this case it does

[19:05]

right I mean the the care solutions. So

[19:08]

here here how it goes right you have

[19:09]

general relativity which was well

[19:11]

formulated by Einstein in uh at the end

[19:15]

of 2015

[19:16]

>> uh 1915 excuse me

[19:18]

>> and this was at the time a new theory of

[19:19]

gravity the massive bodies curve

[19:23]

>> spa what's called spacetime

[19:25]

>> and then then uh certain solutions were

[19:29]

found was the first to found in 2016 a

[19:31]

year immediately a year after found a

[19:33]

so-cal solution which is a stationary

[19:36]

solution

[19:37]

with a lot of symmetries that you can

[19:39]

actually extract from from the theory of

[19:43]

relativity from the angel equations as

[19:45]

exact formula uh and uh uh that had led

[19:50]

to lots of issues because it has a

[19:52]

singularity.

[19:54]

This is connected later on with the

[19:57]

Pendro singularity theorem for which he

[20:00]

actually got a Nobel Prize. He's the

[20:01]

only mathematician to have gotten a

[20:03]

Nobel Prize in physics which is quite

[20:06]

there's nobody else uh in part because

[20:09]

the the the math applied so beautifully

[20:11]

to to

[20:12]

>> right or to a question to a question

[20:14]

that was very important yeah

[20:15]

>> that was very important and and then

[20:17]

there was a second uh second major

[20:19]

development by K this was 1963

[20:23]

uh where the care solutions was okay so

[20:27]

now you have the a care family which

[20:29]

includes Schwarfield it's a it's a large

[20:31]

family depending on two parameters uh so

[20:33]

these are exact solutions of the

[20:35]

equations right I You know from

[20:36]

mathematical

[20:38]

from a mathematical point of view they

[20:39]

are real because for me reality

[20:43]

mathematical reality has to do with

[20:46]

objectic fact that these are solutions

[20:48]

of an equation which you can write down

[20:50]

it's it's

[20:52]

conceptually

[20:54]

>> and may I interrupt for just a moment so

[20:55]

as if I understand one of the remarkable

[20:57]

things about Einstein by the way of

[20:59]

course correct me jump in I'm doing baby

[21:02]

talk here because that is the top of my

[21:04]

form when it comes to this material

[21:07]

Einstein comes up with general

[21:08]

relativity in 1915 and here we are in

[21:11]

2025 and there's still experiment there

[21:14]

have been experiments that have been

[21:16]

done over the course of the succeeding

[21:18]

century as new satellite it new

[21:21]

technology makes new experiments

[21:23]

>> and every single time

[21:26]

>> it's the theory of general relativity is

[21:29]

is proven proven out that is to say

[21:33]

>> this theory that Einstein came up with

[21:35]

on a chalkboard

[21:37]

for a century of experiments now it

[21:40]

turns out to correspond with and predict

[21:42]

reality and and your work if we could

[21:45]

somehow devise experiments on black

[21:49]

holes your work would would prove out

[21:51]

>> well it's it's real to that extent

[21:54]

>> so I I like to call it a test of reality

[21:57]

so the the the fact that the care

[21:59]

solution is stable right it's a

[22:02]

mathematical statement but with a lot of

[22:04]

physical content because let's say if it

[22:08]

was not stable so it's a it's a solution

[22:10]

a correct solution of the equation which

[22:14]

starts with specific initial conditions

[22:16]

right so the the issue of stability is

[22:19]

now you make small pertubations of the

[22:21]

initial conditions and all of a sudden

[22:23]

we get something entirely different

[22:24]

which has nothing to do with the

[22:26]

solution the care solution that would be

[22:29]

called instability right so if if the

[22:33]

care solution would be unstable It means

[22:34]

it doesn't have any physical meaning

[22:36]

right because you you you know it

[22:38]

doesn't correspond to anything that you

[22:39]

can recognize in nature as corresponding

[22:42]

to that right so the stability uh of the

[22:46]

issue of stability is a fundamental

[22:48]

issue in

[22:49]

>> it's a test it's a marker for reality

[22:51]

>> you can say so it's I call it a

[22:53]

mathematical test of reality

[22:54]

>> but that is what's going on here Peter

[22:56]

so interesting

[22:57]

>> explicate for us

[22:58]

>> well from I'm just as from a

[22:59]

philosophical point of view here is that

[23:02]

there's a deep assumption that that

[23:04]

which is mathematically cons consistent,

[23:06]

coherent, stable is going to give us a

[23:09]

guide to physical reality as if there's

[23:12]

a rationality built into the physics

[23:15]

that somehow matches the rationality

[23:17]

that's at work when we're doing this

[23:19]

this type of advanced mathematics. And

[23:22]

so that that's that's the Vner mystery.

[23:25]

Why why does the reason within match the

[23:29]

rationality of nature external to us,

[23:31]

the reason without? All right. So now

[23:34]

now we move into territory.

[23:37]

I'm already in over my head, but I

[23:38]

continue swimming. It gets deeper.

[23:41]

>> May I offer a simple thing that might

[23:43]

help just with because we got into the

[23:45]

the field equations of general

[23:47]

relativity and the the solutions and but

[23:50]

uh uh Sergio started initially talking

[23:53]

about geometry.

[23:54]

>> Yes.

[23:54]

>> And just the idea that mathematical

[23:57]

objects have stable properties. This is

[23:59]

why mathematicians regard them as real.

[24:02]

You know, a circle has certain basic

[24:04]

properties. We it's got a circumference

[24:06]

and area and we can calculate these

[24:08]

things and those properties are true for

[24:11]

all people who think about circles. It's

[24:14]

it's there there are stable properties

[24:15]

that that geometric object has that we

[24:18]

can describe mathematically that's

[24:19]

independent of our minds. Right? And yet

[24:21]

it h and yet the stability of those

[24:23]

properties is a token as as Sue has

[24:26]

explained in our recent conference. It's

[24:27]

a token of of reality of a mind

[24:29]

objective reality, a mind independent

[24:31]

objective reality. And that's why

[24:33]

mathematicians don't think that they're

[24:35]

inventing new mathematical formulas.

[24:38]

They think almost almost universally

[24:41]

feel that they're they're discovering

[24:42]

something, not inventing.

[24:43]

>> Well, there are some who who don't. But

[24:45]

but what's interesting is that

[24:47]

physicists always refer to mathematics

[24:49]

as being an invention of the human mind.

[24:51]

That's what Vner says.

[24:53]

>> Sorry, Einstein says an invention of the

[24:55]

human mind. But Vickness says something

[24:57]

very similar.

[24:58]

>> So I I'm always surprised to see that

[25:03]

>> Einstein felt he invented the general.

[25:05]

>> No, no, no. I Einstein feels that ma

[25:08]

mathematicians invent things,

[25:10]

>> right? So

[25:11]

>> he actually called it a free creation of

[25:14]

the human mind.

[25:15]

>> Right.

[25:15]

>> So

[25:16]

>> by which he meant what?

[25:17]

>> It's not really clear because if it's a

[25:19]

free creation of the human mind, why are

[25:21]

mathematical propositions so dreadfully

[25:24]

necessary?

[25:24]

>> Mhm. I didn't have much choice about 2 +

[25:27]

2 = 4 and I presume you didn't either.

[25:31]

>> But these are

[25:32]

>> kind of at odds with the notion of

[25:34]

spontaneous

[25:36]

spontaneously reaching an invention like

[25:40]

addition doesn't seem to be an invention

[25:43]

at all.

[25:43]

>> But I have a reason why physicists do

[25:46]

that because and I doubt that Newton

[25:49]

would have said that.

[25:50]

>> No,

[25:50]

>> it's a modern it's a modern uh

[25:52]

physicists who are materialists. They do

[25:54]

believe that there is just matter and

[25:57]

everything the mind including has to be

[25:59]

uh determined somehow.

[26:00]

>> You can't be right about Okay. So,

[26:02]

notice what what's in the in the

[26:04]

dialectic here. The mathematicians who

[26:06]

are doing the the math that are

[26:08]

developing the math typically believe

[26:11]

that they are discovering something that

[26:13]

is real and independent of their minds

[26:15]

not not inventing something like an

[26:17]

internal combustion engine or

[26:19]

>> Exactly. I mean any invention has to

[26:21]

have a starting point, right? So it

[26:22]

means that before that starting point

[26:24]

that that mathematical fact did not

[26:27]

exist. Right? Pagora theorem was not

[26:29]

true before Pagora discovered it. It's

[26:31]

kind of ridiculous.

[26:32]

>> But how can anybody who who can

[26:36]

there must be complexities here. I'm

[26:37]

sure there are complexities. I'm not

[26:39]

grasping. But 2 plus 2 equals 4 is true

[26:41]

for me. It's true for you. It's true for

[26:43]

David. No matter how perverse David may

[26:45]

be feeling at any given moment is still

[26:47]

true. It's true and it has been true for

[26:49]

all time. Therefore, there is something

[26:52]

immater. Isn't that doesn't that just

[26:55]

put us a a stake in the heart of

[26:56]

materialism right there? Something ex

[27:00]

exists outside us.

[27:04]

Something we can call it reason or we

[27:05]

could call it platon. Okay. So, let's go

[27:07]

to Plato. If I understand this much

[27:11]

in the republic, Plato draws a

[27:13]

distinction between the intelligible

[27:14]

world.

[27:16]

The sensible world is what we can see

[27:19]

and touch and the intelligible world is

[27:22]

that which we can

[27:25]

is intelligible to us but

[27:28]

>> access we can access through the

[27:30]

intellect. Okay. And so that's where he

[27:32]

places his ideal forms. There is a

[27:34]

circle out there. There is a triangle

[27:36]

out there.

[27:37]

>> Plato says it does have an independent

[27:39]

existence but he seems to suggest that

[27:41]

there's a there's a realm of ideal forms

[27:44]

someplace out there. Aquinus comes along

[27:48]

1500 years later and says ideas exist

[27:54]

in minds

[27:57]

and something that is true for all of us

[27:59]

and for all time that is intelligible

[28:01]

but immaterial exists in the mind of

[28:04]

God.

[28:07]

David.

[28:08]

Yeah. Maybe [laughter]

[28:11]

David was never more David than in that

[28:13]

very moment.

[28:15]

Um I can't make any sense of the

[28:18]

discussion so far. That's my problem. Uh

[28:22]

there is a problem to which Vner was

[28:24]

calling attention which is a real

[28:26]

philosophical problem. That is if

[28:28]

mathematics

[28:30]

is essential

[28:31]

for every physical theory. It cannot be

[28:35]

the case

[28:37]

unless it's a trivial explanation that

[28:40]

there is a physical theory that

[28:42]

physically explains mathematics. I mean,

[28:45]

if a man proposes to catch a carp by

[28:48]

baiting his hook with a carp, he's

[28:50]

engaged in a trivial pursuit. He has the

[28:53]

carp. If we need a physical theory that

[28:55]

includes mathematics to explain

[28:57]

mathematics, we no longer have a

[28:59]

physical theory. We have a physical and

[29:01]

a mathematical theory. And that's the

[29:04]

dilemma. I think the deep dilemma to

[29:06]

which Vner is calling attention. There

[29:08]

are certain principles we'd like to hold

[29:10]

on to. It's part of the cultural

[29:13]

imperative. We'd like to hold on to this

[29:15]

fundamental idea. The world is physical.

[29:18]

We live in a physical world. I'm not

[29:21]

saying this is a commendable idea. I'm

[29:23]

saying it's a cultural imperative

[29:25]

because it seems so reassuring. Look,

[29:27]

we're faced with imponderables. The

[29:30]

basic fact the thing is a material or a

[29:33]

physical object.

[29:35]

It is very inconvenient culturally and

[29:38]

intellectually

[29:39]

to come to the conclusion that in order

[29:41]

to understand that physical object, we

[29:44]

need a whole lot of non-physical facts

[29:46]

about mathematics.

[29:48]

>> And in order to explain a whole lot of

[29:51]

non-physical facts about mathematics,

[29:53]

there is no conception of a physical

[29:56]

theory without mathematics that can do

[29:58]

the explaining. So we're left in the

[30:00]

position that if mathematics is as

[30:02]

useful as Sergey and Steve says and

[30:05]

they're absolutely right about that.

[30:06]

It's useful in daily life. There is

[30:09]

something fundamental wrong

[30:10]

fundamentally wrong with our idea of the

[30:13]

world as a physical system.

[30:15]

>> Exactly.

[30:15]

>> It's something cannot be right.

[30:17]

Something has to give. Either we develop

[30:20]

physics physical theories with no

[30:22]

mathematics. Fineman conjectures

[30:24]

something of this sort. or we agree that

[30:27]

materialism simply cannot be right. One

[30:30]

of the two, but something has to go.

[30:32]

>> But physicists would until now at least

[30:35]

have not given up on the idea of

[30:37]

physicality or realism. So that's that's

[30:40]

that's the issue.

[30:41]

>> But they're not reckoning with the

[30:43]

dilemma that David just described. I

[30:44]

think

[30:45]

>> not me. I mean that dilemma has been in

[30:47]

the literature for at least 50 years or

[30:49]

60 even.

[30:50]

>> Don't understand all of you bright

[30:52]

people. If something's been in the

[30:53]

literature for half a century which

[30:56]

essentially is a stop sign saying wait a

[30:59]

moment wait a moment wait a moment you

[31:01]

have a basic decision to make here about

[31:03]

the nature of reality either it it is

[31:07]

well then how can the academy how can

[31:09]

you academics just ignore it

[31:11]

>> well so okay so I I don't know why and

[31:13]

and like like David

[31:15]

>> but I hold you responsible

[31:17]

>> I I don't want to talk about exist

[31:20]

issues of existence ideas platonic ideas

[31:23]

maybe it's it's a step too far and that

[31:25]

maybe we agree uh but but I I have a

[31:29]

operational definition of reality so

[31:32]

reality is consistency of

[31:34]

representations of a particular object I

[31:37]

mean that that's true in physics and

[31:38]

that's true in mathematics mathematical

[31:40]

objects are real a mathematician who

[31:42]

works on on on a mathematical problem

[31:45]

calculates in this way calculates in

[31:47]

that other way always get the same

[31:49]

result I mean there's something so

[31:51]

obviously objective about what we do,

[31:54]

right? That somehow to claim that these

[31:57]

are just inventions of the human mind is

[31:58]

ridiculous to me. I mean, um, there is a

[32:02]

way to defend any position in

[32:05]

philosophy. I mean, we could argue that

[32:07]

there are inventions of the human mind

[32:09]

because the human mind is the only thing

[32:11]

that really exists. After all, there's a

[32:13]

very noble tradition going right back to

[32:16]

Barkley which makes exactly that case.

[32:18]

To be is to be perceived. But there is

[32:21]

something that uh inhibits a return to

[32:25]

Barclayian idealism

[32:29]

in that it sounds vaguely preposterous

[32:31]

to say the only thing that exists is a

[32:34]

mind. It doesn't comport with the

[32:36]

magnificence of the physical theories

[32:38]

we've just that's not an argument. It's

[32:42]

an observation. But having said that, we

[32:46]

we are really in danger of being reduced

[32:48]

to an ever narrowing ice flow. The ice

[32:52]

flow, as Sergi just mentioned, is the

[32:54]

consistency of representations. Well,

[32:57]

representations is kind of an obscure

[32:59]

term. Why don't we get down to basics?

[33:02]

It's the consistency of our theories.

[33:05]

Well, what is a theory? Well, we can

[33:07]

provide an answer to that. A theory is

[33:09]

kind of a large group of sentences. And

[33:11]

what are sentences? There are things

[33:13]

that make certain kinds of assertions

[33:15]

that can be true or false. And if

[33:17]

they're consistent,

[33:19]

that is about as good as we can get in

[33:22]

terms of the credibility and

[33:24]

commendability of a theory. So we're

[33:27]

reduced now on our ice fold to saying,

[33:29]

well, we have a representation or a

[33:31]

theory about the physical world and it's

[33:34]

consistent, but when we examine it, we

[33:37]

find out it is not a physical object. It

[33:41]

invokes non-physical substances like

[33:44]

mathematical objects. We don't have to

[33:46]

say we we we need not make a decision.

[33:49]

Do they exist in the mind or they exist

[33:50]

in the external world? They exist.

[33:52]

That's all we need. The number two

[33:55]

exists. I don't have to tell you well it

[33:57]

exists in your mind exists in my mind.

[33:59]

That's an irrelevant. It exists. That's

[34:01]

the determinative statement. And as long

[34:04]

as it exists and we acknowledge it's not

[34:07]

physical, then we're left with a

[34:09]

position of saying, how come our best

[34:10]

view of the physical world incorporates

[34:13]

things that are not physical? Why is

[34:14]

that?

[34:15]

>> Existence is an autological question. I

[34:17]

I I I prefer reality uh

[34:22]

is something that I can work with. While

[34:26]

existence, I don't know. When when it

[34:27]

comes to issue existence, I feel lost,

[34:29]

right? I don't exist.

[34:30]

>> You feel exist? I mean I don't know what

[34:33]

exists and what does not exist.

[34:34]

>> What intrigues me in all this is the

[34:37]

idea that those mathematical objects whe

[34:39]

it's the quadratic equation or a circle

[34:43]

or more advanced forms of mathematics

[34:46]

have stable properties. They're when we

[34:50]

when

[34:50]

>> this is the consistency you're talking

[34:52]

>> I talk about reality. Yeah. I prefer to

[34:53]

call reality being objectivity

[34:57]

consistency.

[34:57]

>> Yeah. What Seru is saying is that these

[34:59]

these mathematical structures or objects

[35:03]

have an a reality that's independent of

[35:06]

whether or not I affirm those properties

[35:09]

myself. They're mind independent and yet

[35:12]

they're conceptual essentially. They're

[35:14]

not material, they're conceptual. So it

[35:16]

does raise the question

[35:18]

where do they reside in what if there

[35:21]

are concepts and this is where I think

[35:23]

you were moving in this direction by by

[35:25]

bringing Plato in. Plato had the idea

[35:28]

that there are conceptual realities that

[35:30]

exist in some sort of of heavenly realm.

[35:34]

But Aquinas's critique of that was that

[35:37]

doesn't make any that's not that's not

[35:39]

consistent with our experience. Ideas

[35:40]

exist in minds. And so if the there

[35:43]

there are these objective properties of

[35:45]

material of of mathematical structures

[35:47]

that are independent of our minds. And

[35:49]

if these mathematical structures are

[35:51]

themselves conceptual, it it implies not

[35:54]

that they're floating around someplace,

[35:56]

but they they fund they originate or

[35:59]

reside fundamentally in some

[36:01]

transcendent mind. That's that's the

[36:03]

theistic take on the mathematical

[36:06]

realism.

[36:06]

>> Steve says math exists in the mind of

[36:09]

God. And Sergio says, "No, don't bother

[36:11]

me with that. I'm a working

[36:12]

mathematician. All I need is a piece of

[36:14]

chalk and and a and a blackboard." Well,

[36:16]

an operational definition of reality,

[36:19]

right? And I I the notion that somehow

[36:22]

everything that's real, it's physical

[36:24]

doesn't make sense to me because

[36:26]

mathematical objects are also real.

[36:28]

>> And I think we're all saying whichever,

[36:30]

you know, where you slice this whether

[36:31]

you're a political

[36:32]

>> Yeah, I think that's absolutely right. I

[36:33]

mean, even if we adopt Barklay's

[36:36]

position that to be is to be perceived,

[36:38]

we write we wind up at the same position

[36:40]

that a thoroughly consistent and

[36:42]

coherent coherent view of the universe

[36:45]

simply can't be physical.

[36:47]

>> Yeah.

[36:47]

>> It simply can't be.

[36:48]

>> Agreed. Okay. That actually that

[36:51]

actually strikes even my little mind as

[36:52]

a really quite profound

[36:55]

I'm not going to call it an insight.

[36:56]

It's a discovery. It's something it's a

[36:58]

some a real aspect of reality itself.

[37:01]

Can I revert back to something earlier

[37:03]

in the conversation? It's just something

[37:04]

that from David's book. He gave a he

[37:06]

gave a talk in in the US on this one

[37:08]

time and it just it just was so

[37:10]

intriguing to me. It was I think it was

[37:13]

from your book 123 when you were talking

[37:14]

about it on the road and it was he he he

[37:18]

showed how I think it was the complex

[37:20]

variables, the complex numbers. Remember

[37:23]

the square root of negative one from

[37:25]

math. There's this whole mathematical

[37:27]

apparatus that's been developed around

[37:28]

complex numbers and it seems like it has

[37:31]

absolutely nothing to do with anything

[37:33]

but there's a whole body of mathematics

[37:36]

on this. I I took a course in grad

[37:37]

school on on complex variables and David

[37:40]

showed that this was invented something

[37:42]

like what was 140 developed

[37:45]

140 years before

[37:46]

>> 200 maybe 200

[37:47]

>> and then lo and behold it's absolutely

[37:50]

crucial for doing quantum mechanics

[37:51]

which is our most fundamental physical

[37:53]

theory or one of them. No, but but if I

[37:56]

can Yeah, please correct me. What what

[37:58]

what is fascinating about the history of

[38:00]

the invention of the number I is that uh

[38:03]

well it it came up in it in Italy uh in

[38:07]

around you know 14th century 14

[38:10]

>> 16th century

[38:11]

>> no earlier I think 1450 yeah okay 1450 a

[38:16]

bit earlier maybe but in any case it was

[38:18]

based on their desire to solve equations

[38:21]

so they wanted to solve first the

[38:22]

quadratic equation there was a formula

[38:24]

already uh the Arabs apparently also

[38:27]

knew it already. In any case, they they

[38:28]

they went to the third order equation

[38:31]

and they found that uh it it pays to

[38:34]

introduce this symbol square root of

[38:36]

minus one which makes no sense. You

[38:38]

cannot take the square root of minus

[38:39]

one, right? But they just put it there

[38:42]

>> and they made this incredible

[38:44]

observation that you can use this number

[38:47]

and at the end you are getting a

[38:49]

solution of of a cubic equations which

[38:52]

are all reals. nothing to do with those

[38:54]

complex numbers but they enter into the

[38:56]

formula for for so this was quite an

[38:59]

amazing thing right so then little by

[39:01]

little they got used to this using

[39:03]

square root of minus one and uh at some

[39:06]

point in the 19th century uh it was even

[39:09]

made more formal geomet it it was given

[39:12]

a geometric rep geometric definition of

[39:16]

scores of minus one and have complex

[39:18]

numbers and complex functions and and

[39:20]

then the enormous amount of applications

[39:22]

came out of it. So it's square root of

[39:25]

minus one is is obviously real. It

[39:27]

existed before it was discovered by

[39:29]

>> there's a very interesting I mean I made

[39:31]

a basic mistake in ninth grade when they

[39:34]

introduced negative numbers I stopped

[39:35]

paying attention negative numbers

[39:38]

nothing to do with reality but I was

[39:39]

wrong then

[39:39]

>> Peter it's not negative these are

[39:41]

complex numbers the square root of

[39:43]

minus1 negative numbers are minus1

[39:45]

minus2 think of debts

[39:47]

>> we're not talking about debts now we're

[39:48]

talking about a complex number but

[39:50]

here's the extraordinarily interesting

[39:52]

point you got this

[39:53]

>> weirdo Italian mathematician of 15th

[39:56]

century who figures out that if I

[39:58]

introduce the symbol I equals the square

[40:00]

root of minus1 I can solidify a chain of

[40:04]

inference and come out with the right

[40:07]

answer. Just absolutely amazing.

[40:09]

However, when mathematicians start to

[40:12]

think about it, it's entirely possible

[40:15]

to get rid of the square root of minus1

[40:18]

in favor of two real numbers and a set

[40:22]

of rules for manipulating them. All of a

[40:24]

sudden the square root of minus1 is

[40:27]

gone. You're left with what you began

[40:29]

with the real numbers 3 and 7 in a

[40:33]

certain order and obeying certain rules.

[40:36]

>> A multiplication rule which is

[40:37]

essential. So that's the complex number.

[40:39]

>> The complex number. Exactly.

[40:40]

>> It's a multip it's a new multiplication

[40:42]

rule which was not did not exist in the

[40:45]

realm of of of

[40:47]

real what is called real natural

[40:48]

numbers. But that that introduces a very

[40:51]

interesting analytical point that

[40:53]

ontology can be reduced in favor of a

[40:57]

system of rules and regulations.

[41:00]

You can reduce the ontological burden of

[41:03]

mathematics. You can say I'm going to

[41:05]

get rid of the numbers in favor of the

[41:07]

sets. I'm going to get rid of the

[41:09]

complex numbers in favor of ordered

[41:11]

pairs of real numbers. I'm going to get

[41:13]

rid of the real numbers in favor of

[41:15]

convergent sequences. I'm going to get

[41:17]

rid of so much. But as you reduce the

[41:20]

burden of ontology, you increase the

[41:23]

burden of your regulations. So you

[41:26]

actually never get to the point where

[41:28]

mathematics appears from nothing. You

[41:31]

never get to that point. Like biology

[41:36]

just being the affirmation of what's

[41:37]

really true, something substantially

[41:40]

real.

[41:40]

>> I mean, biologists love to say life

[41:43]

comes only from life. 19th century, it's

[41:45]

obviously true. Life comes only from

[41:47]

life. and how it might not come from

[41:49]

life is an utter mystery. But it's also

[41:52]

true that language comes only from

[41:54]

language and it's additionally true that

[41:56]

mathematics only comes from mathematics.

[41:59]

These seem to be processes with which we

[42:02]

have a good deal of experience which

[42:04]

have no point of origin. There is no

[42:08]

place in which mathematics originates.

[42:10]

There's no place in which language

[42:12]

originates and there is no place in

[42:14]

which life originates. They may well be

[42:17]

fundamental features of the universe

[42:19]

itself.

[42:21]

>> But nevertheless, mathematics has a

[42:23]

history. So, and in this article,

[42:26]

>> but it it's infinite in the past,

[42:30]

>> right? I mean, it's a human. So, there

[42:32]

is something human about mathematics.

[42:34]

>> There's a history of our discovery, but

[42:36]

not a a history to the realities.

[42:38]

>> Exactly. That we are discovering. The

[42:40]

way we discover

[42:42]

>> right

[42:43]

>> okay

[42:45]

David this is you in a recent um this is

[42:47]

a conversation you had I think with

[42:49]

Steve in Cambridge

[42:50]

>> I'm going to quote a passage

[42:53]

hold up a finger could this finger be a

[42:56]

different color yes could it be slightly

[42:58]

longer yes could it be crooked yes but

[43:01]

it could it ever be anything other than

[43:03]

one finger

[43:06]

no the number is obligatory the number

[43:09]

the The number is something the finger

[43:11]

essentially has. Close quote.

[43:16]

All right. So now we're in the realm of

[43:18]

Aristotle and the difference between

[43:20]

essence,

[43:22]

>> essential properties and non-essential

[43:23]

properties

[43:24]

>> and accidents. Essential properties and

[43:26]

accidents. Explain this.

[43:28]

>> Well,

[43:29]

>> I feel as though I'm tiptoeing around.

[43:30]

Wow, Robinson.

[43:31]

>> All right. All right. So numbers

[43:32]

represent an essential aspect of

[43:35]

reality. That's a big deal. Well, it's

[43:38]

it's a very general statement. I I much

[43:40]

prefer, God forbid me, forgive me for

[43:44]

introducing Haidiger, I much prefer his

[43:46]

formulation. Haidiger and they're very

[43:49]

interesting passages in his work. I

[43:51]

admit it. And he says, "Look, when we

[43:53]

look at objects,

[43:55]

we cannot separate the oneness of this

[43:58]

glass from the object itself. But we can

[44:01]

change the color. We can change the

[44:02]

shape and still be the same object, but

[44:04]

we can say this one object could have

[44:07]

been two. That just doesn't go. So when

[44:11]

we talk about physical objects, we're

[44:14]

only talking now about physically

[44:16]

realizable objects, their mathematical

[44:20]

aspects are essential to them.

[44:24]

What holds for numbers also holds for

[44:25]

shape.

[44:27]

uh we don't have to do what Eugene Vner

[44:31]

did and say look at quantum mechanics

[44:33]

and the remarkable fact that Hilbert

[44:36]

spaces require introduction complex

[44:39]

numbers. No, just look at the glass. The

[44:42]

glass requires the introduction of a

[44:44]

natural number. Two glasses require the

[44:47]

introduction of two natural numbers.

[44:49]

That is every bit as mysterious as the

[44:53]

invocation of complex numbers and

[44:55]

quantum field theory. every bit is

[44:56]

mysterious and we don't know quite why.

[44:59]

>> Okay. So, all three of you are willing

[45:01]

to agree in all three of you are willing

[45:04]

to insist

[45:06]

that mathematics,

[45:09]

the existence of mathematics, the weird

[45:12]

way in which mathematics seems to

[45:14]

correspond with and help us to

[45:15]

investigate reality in a way that is

[45:17]

real. I'm using reality over and over

[45:19]

again. proves that reality is not purely

[45:25]

not limited to what we can access by our

[45:27]

five senses.

[45:28]

>> It's a hint. It doesn't prove. It's a

[45:30]

hint.

[45:31]

>> Oh, now I've lost ground even from that.

[45:33]

Oh, so all we have is a hint. So why

[45:35]

aren't you I think Steve is willing to

[45:37]

go. Now here I am putting words into

[45:39]

Steve's mouth. Steve is willing to say

[45:43]

we're dealing here with the mind of I

[45:45]

think what David's getting

[45:46]

>> and David is David won't do that no

[45:48]

matter how much pin you down and you

[45:50]

would I'll give I'll give you sort of an

[45:53]

example of something like this so uh you

[45:56]

know immediately after Newton there was

[45:58]

Newtonian mechanics the idea was that

[46:01]

Newtonian mechanics has to explain

[46:02]

everything then came Maxwell the Maxwell

[46:05]

equations and in order to uh adjust the

[46:11]

maxwell equations to Newtonian

[46:12]

mechanics. they need they needed this

[46:14]

notion of ether right so uh you know

[46:17]

ether here is that there

[46:20]

at some point I mean Einstein's great

[46:22]

insight was we don't need it right so

[46:25]

it's the same thing I believe we don't

[46:27]

need this materialistic representation

[46:29]

of the world just forget about it

[46:31]

reality means something broader than

[46:33]

that

[46:34]

>> it's inconsistent with the most obvious

[46:35]

presentation of of mathematics itself

[46:38]

it's it's obvious that mathematical

[46:40]

properties are not material you and

[46:43]

invent a metaphysical system that

[46:45]

explains that away. That's why it's not

[46:46]

a proof. But

[46:48]

>> so nobody proved the ether is not does

[46:50]

not exist. But we just get rid of it.

[46:52]

Yeah.

[46:52]

>> And I think that's what we should do

[46:54]

about

[46:54]

>> I think I could agree with that. But

[46:57]

going back to your last remark, Peter, I

[47:00]

think it's just much simpler to say that

[47:03]

the mystery is just the existence of

[47:06]

mathematics.

[47:07]

It's just that because it's fundamental.

[47:11]

We could well say and of course

[47:13]

philosophers have well said we can get

[47:16]

rid of the physical world.

[47:18]

Metaphysically that's not a problem.

[47:19]

Barkley showed how everything is a

[47:21]

perception or an idea. External world

[47:24]

just disappears. But we can't get rid of

[47:27]

the mathematical world. That's

[47:29]

ineliminable

[47:31]

and its existence is a profound mystery.

[47:33]

What is it doing there? Why do we see

[47:37]

things in mathematical terms? Now, I'm

[47:40]

not asking this question because I have

[47:41]

a secret answer. I I'm prepared to

[47:43]

vouch. Say

[47:44]

>> I was hoping you would wrap up the

[47:46]

conversation with the answer.

[47:47]

>> I I find it a great mystery. The sheer

[47:49]

existence of mathematics is deeply

[47:52]

puzzling.

[47:52]

>> You will agree with every word of that.

[47:54]

>> Yeah, absolutely.

[47:55]

>> And and you'll agree, but can you take

[47:57]

it farther? Well, I just am intrigued

[48:00]

with this kind of argument that I

[48:02]

recapitulated earlier in the

[48:03]

conversation that that mathematical

[48:05]

objects have stable properties.

[48:07]

Therefore, they have an objectivity that

[48:09]

is independent of our minds. And yet,

[48:11]

they are conceptual, which suggests

[48:13]

suggests by our experience that they

[48:15]

must not be floating around somewhere in

[48:17]

the Platonic heavens, but rather it

[48:20]

makes more sense to me to think that

[48:21]

they ultimately issue from the mind of

[48:23]

God. And that that is the deep reason

[48:25]

for the mysterious applicability of

[48:28]

mathematics to the physical world.

[48:29]

>> Bear in mind, Steve, that you're

[48:31]

reaching a position very close to

[48:33]

Barkley's position.

[48:34]

>> To who? To Barkley. Bishop Bar. I mean

[48:36]

if you say that to be is to be perceived

[48:39]

>> Bishop Barkley 17th century British 18th

[48:42]

century English churchman and

[48:44]

philosopher uh who appears possibly most

[48:47]

famously in Boswell's life of Johnson

[48:49]

when Boswell

[48:50]

>> I refute Barkley thus thus Johnson

[48:52]

kicking a rock

[48:53]

>> but the point faced the obvious question

[48:56]

if you're not looking at the moon

[48:57]

Einstein discusses this too does the

[48:59]

moon continue to exist and Barklay's

[49:02]

response was yes it exists as a thought

[49:04]

in the mind of God, which is very close

[49:07]

to what Steve was just all although he's

[49:09]

certainly not

[49:10]

>> I'm not Yeah, I don't I don't think the

[49:12]

physical world is has a I think it has a

[49:16]

mind an independence of our mind and of

[49:18]

the mind of God who created it. But I

[49:20]

think the ultimate source of

[49:21]

mathematical reality may well be the

[49:23]

mind of God. But it's interesting that

[49:24]

you are prepared to go further than I

[49:27]

think many contemporary analytic

[49:29]

philosophers are prepared to go in the

[49:31]

direction of a Barclayian kind of

[49:33]

analysis which I think is in this case

[49:36]

the only analysis that makes sense

[49:37]

>> at least for math at least for math

[49:39]

because it is so mysterious.

[49:40]

>> Boys I'm going to attempt for last

[49:42]

question here. I'm going to attempt to

[49:43]

introduce one new concept and that is

[49:47]

the concept of beauty. I have no idea

[49:51]

how this will go, but here's an excerpt

[49:53]

from the forthcoming documentary, The

[49:56]

Story of Everything.

[50:00]

There's something in science called the

[50:01]

beauty principle that says true theories

[50:04]

often convey a mathematical beauty or

[50:07]

structural harmony.

[50:11]

Upon looking at their model of the DNA

[50:14]

molecule, Francis Crick was quoted as

[50:17]

saying,

[50:19]

"It's so beautiful. It's got to be

[50:21]

right."

[50:23]

>> Explain that.

[50:24]

>> Why should beauty enter into this?

[50:26]

>> It we don't really know, but it tends to

[50:29]

be what's called a heristic guide in

[50:32]

science, a guide to discovery. And in

[50:34]

the in the section of the film that

[50:36]

follows, uh there were maybe perhaps

[50:38]

even more trenchant comments from a

[50:40]

couple of the physicists who were saying

[50:43]

how often their perception of

[50:45]

mathematical beauty had been a guide to

[50:47]

discovery. I think it was Paul Dak who

[50:49]

first said that it's more important for

[50:51]

the theories are beautiful than than to

[50:53]

to have them consistent with the data

[50:56]

because eventually u well because we can

[50:59]

be mistaken about how we're perceiving

[51:01]

the data. But there there is assumption

[51:03]

that there's something mathematically

[51:05]

beautiful about about reality itself.

[51:07]

intelligibility.

[51:08]

>> Draco was mesmerized by

[51:10]

>> Sorry, who was Dra?

[51:11]

>> Did I say I said Dra? Yeah, Draco was

[51:13]

mesmerized by by

[51:15]

>> and you said a moment ago when you were

[51:16]

choosing projects on which to work, you

[51:20]

I think you used the word is it elegant?

[51:21]

Is it beautiful

[51:22]

>> of course why the care solution is an

[51:26]

incredible

[51:27]

incredible object. I mean very really

[51:30]

beautiful. I mean yeah.

[51:31]

>> Are we on another mystery here? An

[51:33]

aesthetic mystery. Beauty

[51:36]

plays a a fundamental role of course in

[51:38]

the way we choose problems but also in

[51:41]

the way we are guiding ourselves towards

[51:43]

the truth. I mean it towards a solution

[51:45]

of a problem. Uh somehow we reject

[51:48]

reject arguments which are contrived

[51:50]

which are not beautiful. We don't call

[51:52]

them beautiful. Uh yeah I mean it's

[51:54]

mysteriously true. Uh and physics of

[51:57]

course is full of such examples.

[51:59]

uh Maxwell you know the the Maxwell the

[52:04]

way the Maxwell equations were

[52:05]

discovered it was first Faraday who had

[52:09]

uh the three laws of electron mine that

[52:12]

is already discovered experimentally

[52:14]

>> that's right

[52:14]

>> and then uh but he was not a mathemat

[52:16]

mathematician at all so he he just he

[52:19]

just uh left it there and just stated

[52:23]

the laws and it was Maxwell who realized

[52:26]

that if you put those statements within

[52:28]

mathematics

[52:29]

there's a lack of symmetry in sort of

[52:32]

guided him towards a force one uh which

[52:35]

led to electromagnetism.

[52:37]

So, uh, and all of the technology of the

[52:40]

of the modern world,

[52:42]

>> beauty,

[52:42]

>> Maxwell with Maxwell. Yeah.

[52:44]

>> Your your comment upon beauty.

[52:45]

>> Yeah. I'd like to hear from these guys

[52:46]

cuz Yeah.

[52:48]

>> I kind of reserve that for my tailor.

[52:51]

[laughter]

[52:53]

>> Well, you know, I can tell you that as a

[52:57]

working mathematician, it plays

[52:59]

absolutely a fundamental role in

[53:00]

everything people do. really

[53:02]

>> there are very few mathematicians who

[53:03]

would say I work on this because it's

[53:06]

it's it's just ugly right I mean you

[53:09]

know they they choose the the problems

[53:13]

or directions based on

[53:17]

>> party line Sergey there are all sorts of

[53:19]

mathematical drabs that we keep hidden

[53:22]

>> nobody's going to tell me turbulence is

[53:24]

a beautiful subject

[53:25]

>> oh it's a it's a fantastic subject

[53:27]

>> fantastic but not beautiful clumsy

[53:30]

lumbering Well, but but the expectation

[53:34]

is that we'll find we find the beauty in

[53:39]

in turbulence by

[53:40]

>> expectations are easily purchased.

[53:43]

Beauty comes at famine prices.

[53:47]

>> All right, kick him because he's being

[53:48]

perverse now. He's he's being he's being

[53:51]

mischievous. Last question. Isaac

[53:53]

Newton, the man who gave us mathematics

[53:56]

that on astronomy, fluid dynamics, and

[54:00]

>> calculus, and Newton explains a lot.

[54:03]

Here's a quotation from Newton. A

[54:06]

heavenly master governs all the world as

[54:10]

sovereign of the universe. Close quote.

[54:14]

A recognition of the divine or a mind

[54:17]

that transcends our own is taken for

[54:20]

granted for thousands of years

[54:23]

new as recently as Newton and then it

[54:26]

gets kicked out of intellectual life and

[54:29]

kicked out of the academy.

[54:35]

Does the mystery of mathematics

[54:38]

suggest

[54:42]

that the materialist error was an

[54:44]

aberration

[54:47]

that ought to and may be may be ending

[54:50]

now. Are you willing to go that far,

[54:52]

Steve?

[54:52]

>> Yeah, of course. I think that's exactly

[54:54]

right. And what Newton illustrates so

[54:57]

beautifully is that this princip this

[54:58]

principle of intelligibility that we've

[55:00]

been talking about that the mathematical

[55:03]

rationality that can be developed by

[55:05]

mathematicians without necessarily

[55:07]

observing nature does then apply to

[55:11]

understanding the rationality that's

[55:12]

built into nature. And this was so

[55:14]

crucial to the the period of the

[55:16]

scientific revolution when these the

[55:19]

these systematic methods for

[55:22]

interrogating nature, for studying

[55:23]

nature were developed and culminating in

[55:26]

figures that that maybe is no figure

[55:28]

like Newton who was so profound in his

[55:31]

his insight and who advanced what was

[55:34]

called natural philosophy that or

[55:36]

science so much in one generation. Even

[55:39]

even in one year his famed Annis

[55:42]

Morabilus where he went home uh during

[55:45]

the plague to remediate his own

[55:49]

deficiencies in mathematics and came

[55:51]

back having invented the calculus you

[55:53]

know. So

[55:54]

>> a heavenly master David.

[56:00]

>> All right.

[56:01]

>> What can I say? That insight has not

[56:04]

been vouch safe to me.

[56:07]

>> Fair enough. Sergio.

[56:09]

>> Well, okay. So, uh, first of all, I

[56:12]

think materialism should I mean

[56:14]

materialism is just the only explanation

[56:16]

of of the world should be put in the ash

[56:19]

bin of history. So, that with that that

[56:21]

we both agree.

[56:22]

>> Yeah.

[56:22]

>> Uh, bringing God in. Sure, why not? I

[56:26]

mean, that's another way of looking at

[56:27]

the world whether if there is something

[56:30]

else. Well, let's find out. Maybe there

[56:33]

is another explanation. But at this

[56:35]

point I don't see any reason why you

[56:39]

should not look at that possibility.

[56:43]

>> So

[56:45]

God exists me and why not

[56:50]

>> Serge Clanerman, David Berinsky and

[56:53]

Steve Meyer. Gentlemen, thank you.

[56:55]

>> It's been our privilege. Peter

[56:58]

>> for Uncommon Knowledge, the Hoover

[56:59]

Institution and Fox Nation. I'm Peter

[57:02]

Robinson.

[57:05]

>> [music]

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