State Legislatures in India: Debates, Federalism, and Institutional Reforms

Hello everyone. In our week on state legislatures, today I'm going to talk to all of you a little

bit more on the debates on state legislatures in India. Now we know that state legislatures are the law

makingaking bodies of India states. and are a very vital component of the country's federal democratic system.

Constituted under part six article 168 to 212 of the constitution they legislate on subjects in the state list

and concurrent list approve state budgets and hold the executive accountable.

But despite their constitutional importance, the functioning powers and effectiveness of state legislatures

have been the subject of extensive academic, political and constitutional debate.

Let's begin by first going back to the constituent assembly debates which were held between 1946 and 1949. During the

drafting of the Indian constitution, the framers engaged in intense debates on how state level democracy should be

structured. Bicamellerism versus unicamealism. Vidan Parishads. Prominent members like

KT Sha argued against creating the legislative councils the Vidan Parishads at the state level.

They viewed second chambers as expensive, undemocratic, and unnecessary stumbling blocks that could delay

progressive legislation. Others argued that upper houses provided a stabilizing influence and allowed experts or

seasoned statesmen to contribute without facing direct elections. However, there are arguments in favor of biccamealism

to make the second chamber as a revising house. Now supporters here argued that a legislative council or a Vidhan Parishad

would act as a revising chamber carefully examining bills passed by the legislative assembly. This would prevent

hasty legislation, correct drafting errors and encourage thoughtful deliberation. Ang Gopal Swami Ayangar in

fact argued that a second chamber would moderate legislative excesses and improve the quality of law making. It

was argued that biccamalism would provide representation of special interests. Legislative councils were

designed to include representatives of local bodies, teachers, graduates and persons with specialized knowledge.

Supporters believed this would enrich legislative discussions by bringing expertise into governance. There would

be continuity and stability. Unlike legislative assemblies, the legislative councils are permanent bodies with

onethird of their members retiring every two years. Now, the advantages include institutional continuity, stability

during political changes and preservation of legislative experience. There would be protection against

majoritarianism because a second chamber was viewed as a safeguard against temporary political majorities. It could

delay controversial legislation, encourage reconsideration and promote consensus building. It was

argued that there would be better legislative deliberation. Supporters argued that democracy required not

merely majority rule but informed discussion. The council would improve debate, reduce impulsive decision and

strengthen legislative scrutiny. Now there are arguments however against bicamealism too and they were that it

would cause unnecessary delay. Many members argue that legislative councils merely delayed legislation without

having real authority. Since the assembly ultimately prevailed in most cases, critics believed the

council added little value. They argued that a second house would add financial burden as maintaining a second house

required salaries, infrastructure, administrative staff, elections, and other operational costs. Critics also

questioned whether newly independent states could justify this expenditure. It was also accused of having

anti-democratic character because unlike legislative assemblies, legislative councils are not directly elected by the

entire electorate. Now, some members argued that democratic legitimacy rested with a popularly elected assembly and

indirect elections weakened accountability. Several members feared that governments

would use legislative councils to accommodate defeated politicians, revolt political supporters, and expand

political patronage. And this criticism remains relevant in contemporary debates.

There was also fear that it would lead to duplic on this issue. Let's look at the views

of key members of the constituent assembly. Now Dr. Bedkar did not insist that every state should have two houses.

He favored flexibility rather than constitutional compulsion and supported allowing the states to decide whether

they needed a legislative council. En Gopala Swami Ayangar strongly defended by camealism

considered the legislative council a revising and deliberative body and emphasized careful scrutiny of

legislation rather than obstruction. Lokath Mishra he supported second chambers as institutions

that could provide mature and reflective legislative discussion. Mohammad Taher expressed concerns about

the practical utility and democratic value of legislative councils and favored simpler legislative structures

in many states. The constitutional compromise was that the constituent assembly rejected both

extremes. It did not make biccamalism compulsory for all states. It did not abolish

legislative councils altogether. Instead, it adopted a flexible federal model.

So, this led to article 168 which provides that states may have a governor and one legislative house or legislative

assembly or a governor and two legislative houses, legislative assembly and legislative council. It also led to

article 169 which allows the parliament to create or abolish a legislative council if the concerned state

legislative assembly passes a resolution by majority of the total membership and a majority of not less than twothirds of

the members present and voting. This arrangement allows states to adapt their legislative structure to changing

political and administrative needs. Let's now look at legislative autonomy and federal balance. Federalists argued

for maximum financial and policy autonomy for state assemblies under the state list. However, in the wake of

partition, national unity was prioritized, resulting in provisions that allow the central government or

parliament to override state subjects under specific circumstances. For example, article 249, the emergency

provisions. Let's look at also contemporary institutional and governance debates

when it comes to the state parliaments. Now there is declining effectiveness of legislative oversight. What does this

mean? So a major concern is whether state legislators are effectively holding the governments accountable.

What are the issues here? Fewer sitting days than recommended. Reduced question hour and debates.

Limited discussion on budgets. increasing reliance on voice votes and quick passage of bills,

weak committee systems. Studies show that many state assemblies meet for relatively few days each year,

limiting the legislative scrutiny and executive accountability. Let's look at now also the quality of

law making. Critics argue that many bills are passed with insufficient debate. So the concerns here are that

the bills are introduced and passed within the same session, that there is limited consultation with stakeholders,

that there is rare referral to subject committees and that there is minimal impact

assessments. The supporters of faster legislative processes they in fact argue that

governments require efficiency to implement the public policies promptly. Let's now look at also on the debate on

federalism and legislative autonomy. Now state legislators are central to India's federal structure. Yet there is

continuous debate over their autonomy. What are the key issues here? Expansion of union influence through concurrent

list legislation. Central laws overriding state laws in certain circumstances.

Use of article 249 and 252. Increasing role of national policies in traditional state subjects.

Many scholars argue that growing centralization weakens the legislative autonomy of states.

Next, let us look at the governor's role in state legislatores. And this is a topic on which there has been enormous

debate. Now, the constitutional provision of the governor actually remains controversial.

Members of the constituent assembly debated whether state governor should be directly elected by the public or

nominated by the union government. Direct election was rejected to prevent conflict between an elected governor and

an elected chief minister. Instead, the assembly settled on presidential nomination through warnings

which were raised about potential central interference in state autonomy. Now, when it comes to the governor,

there were various areas of debate. Delays in granting ascent to bills, reserving bills for the president,

the governor's address to the legislature, summoning and proging sessions,

perceived political neutrality of governors. In fact, recent disputes in several states have renewed the

discussions regarding the constitutional limits of gubernatorial discretion. Let's look here now on the

anti-defectionection law. Now the 10th schedule aims to prevent political instability but it has

generated debate. Now supporters argue that it prevents horse trading,

it ensures political stability, it protects electoral mandates. But critics argue that it restricts

legislators freedom of speech. It weakens deliberative democracy. It concentrates power in political party

leadership. Let's look now at representation and inclusiveness.

Now another debate which concerns whether state legislators are adequately representing society.

Issues here are that women's representation remains comparatively low although constitutional changes provide

for one-third reservation in state legislatures once implemented after delimitation.

Another issue is the under reppresentation of minorities and marginalized communities. There is also

the issue of the criminalization of politics and then the issue of the influence of money power in elections.

Now let's look at the debate of legislative productivity versus deliberation.

There is disagreement over how legislative performance should. Now one perspective is more bills passed

indicates greater efficiency. Faster legislative processes improve governance. Now the alternative

perspective is that legislative quality matters more than quantity. Thorough debate and committee examination produce

better laws. Effective oversight is as important as law making. Let's now also look at the debate on the

digital transformation of state legislatures. Modern legislatures are increasingly

adopting digital technologies. Advantages here are e-legislatures they improve transparency.

Digital records they increase public accessibility. Online committee meetings improve

efficiency. Better public participation happens through technology.

On the other hand, challenges here definitely are there too like digital divide across the states, cyber security

concerns, need for training legislators and staff. Now after this, let's look at how we are

going to strengthen the committee systems. What are the debates around that? Because many constitutional

experts have advocated for stronger legislative committees. The suggested reforms here are one mandatory scrutiny

of important bills, two greater resource support for legislators, three expert consultation,

four public participation during committee hearings. Five, publication of committee reports.

The committees are regarded as essential for improving legislative quality and executive accountability.

Now in recent decades, the debate around the state parliaments and the state legislatures has shifted towards

operational health effectiveness and the constitutional role of the state legislative assemblies like the Vidhan

Sabhas. One point here is the decline of the sitting days. A central debate centers

on the decline in duration of assembly sessions across the states. What is the reality? Now, according to legislative

tracking studies such as PRS, legislative research, state assemblies meet for an average of just 20 to 25

days per year with a significant portion of business packed into short budget sessions. The impact of this is short

sessions severely limit the time for opposition questions, private members business and scrutiny of state budgets.

The reforms have often proposed enforcing a constitutional minimum for example 60 to 19 days annually depending

on state size as recommended by the NCRWC. There's also debate around hasty law

makingaking and lack of committee scrutiny because unlike the parliament of India which revise heavily on

department related standing committees, most state legislators lack robust standing committee systems to scrutinize

draft bills. A vast majority of state level bills are introduced and passed on the same day or within 24 to 48 hours

with minimal debate. Critics argue that bypassing public feedback and detailed committee review

leads to poor legislation and frequent judicial challenges. Let's delve a little bit more deeper on

the role of the governor versus the state assemblies. Now this tension between the governor

and the state assembly or the vidhan sabha is one of the most prominent flash points in Indian federalism.

While the governor is formally the constitutional head of the state, state governments operate under a

parliamentary system where real executive authority rests with the elected council of ministers led by the

chief minister. Tensions arise because the governor is appointed by the central government

often leading to conflict of interests when different political parties rule at the national and the state levels.

Thus the dynamic between state governments, legislators and governatorial offices is one of the most

fury constitutional debates in modern Indian federalism. Now what's the constitutional role here?

The governor is a nominal head versus the elected representatives. Under article 163 of the Indian constitution,

the governor is required to exercise their functions on the aid and advice of the council of ministers

except in areas where the constitution explicitly grants them discretionary powers. in the Supreme Court. This was

established in Shams Singh versus State of Punjab case of 1974 that the governor is a formal constitutional figurehead.

They do not possess an independent executive power that can override the elected cabinet. Let's look at some key

areas of conflict here. It can happen with regard to ascent to bills article 200. When the state assembly passes a

bill, it goes to the governor under article 200 which presents three primary options. One, to grant ascent. Two, to

withhold ascent and return the bill with a message requesting reconsideration. Three, reserve the bill for the

consideration of the president. Now the conflict here happens when governors in several states they have

held on to bills passed by elected assemblies for months or years without taking action. A tactic which has come

to be known as quote unquote pocket veto. Now there was a judicial landmark case

here. The state of Tamil Nadu versus governor 2025. Addressing the infinite delays by

governors, the Supreme Court ruled that a governor cannot exercise an absolute or a pocket veto. The court held that if

a governor withholds ascent, they must return the bill to the assembly. If the assembly repasses the bill, the governor

is constitutionally bound to grant ascent and cannot retroactively reserve it for the president. The court also

sets judicial time frames typically one to three months for action. The next point is with regard to

summoning, preroging and dissolving the assembly. Under article 174, the governor summons

the legislative house. The conflict happens when questions arise over whether a governor can refuse to convene

the assembly when requested by the cabinet or conversely force a floor test. What does the law state? In Nabam

Rabia versus deputy speaker 2016, the Supreme Court ruled that the governor can summon or progue the house only on

the aid and advice of the cabinet. The governor has discretionary power to order a floor test only if there is

objective material showing the government has lost its majority. Now the governor also has a role as the

university chancellors. In many states the governor acts as ex official chancellor of stateun

universities. The conflict here is that governors have clashed with state governments over the appointment of the

vice chancellors or the VCs. State assemblies have frequently passed bills to remove the governor as

chancellor and replace them with a chief minister or an eminent academic leading the governors to stall those very bills.

Now there's also a lot of debate about the recommending of president's rule article 356.

Historically governors have been accused of acting as agents of the union government by

sending reports recommending the dismissal of state governments and imposing president's rule under article

356. What is the safeguard here? In SR Bombay versus Union of India 1994, the Supreme

Court held that the governor's report under article 356 is subject to judicial review and the strength of a ministry

must be tested only on the floor of the house, not in the governor's private assessment.

Let's look now at the anti-defectionection law and disqualification powers. In India, there

is no separate quote unquote state parliament. The laws governing state assemblies, Vidhan Sabhas and Vidhan

Parishads are integrated directly into the Indian constitution. The anti-defectionection law enacted via

the 10th schedule and by the 52nd constitutional amendment in 1985. It applies equally to both the national

parliament and all state legislators granting the assembly speaker the authority to decide on the

disqualification petitions at the state level. The key constitutional mechanisms recent

controversies and debates regarding the anti-defectionection law function as follows.

Where articles 101 and 102 apply anti-defectionection provisions to MPs in parliament. articles 190 191 to apply

the exact same 10 schedule which rules to state MLAs and MLC's. Now under the 10th schedule, a state

legislature faces disqualification if one voluntary regation conduct. They voluntarily give up their

political party membership because courts have ruled this includes actions outside the house such as supporting an

opposition party. Number two, for defying the party whip. They vote or abstain from voting contrary to the

party's official direction or the whip without prior permission. Number three, independent and nominated members. an

independent MLA joins the political party post election or a nominated member joins a party after 6 months.

Now we can also talk about the 2/3 merger exception because disqualification is avoided only

if at least 2/3 of the members of a legislative party agree to merge with another political party. The earlier

provision of allowing a split by one-third of members was abolished in 2003 via the 91st amendment. Now over

the past decade, state politics in India such as in Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Goa has seen political

parties find loopholes in the 10th schedule. There's also the issue of mass resignations. the operation lotus

strategy. Instead of directly defecting to another party which would trigger

disqualification, MLAs resign from their seats entirely and this reduces the overall strength of

the house bringing down the majority mark and causing the ruling government to fall. The resigned MLAs then run in

the resulting bi-elections under the new parties ticket. Now let's also again talk about the

speaker's delay or the pocket veto. Because the law does not prescribe a strict deadline for deciding on

disqualification petitions, state speakers who often hail from the ruling party sit on petitions

indefinite. By the time a decision is made, the assembly's 5-year term is often nearly over. Now in state

assemblies, the speaker acts as a judicial tribunal to decide on disqualification petitions. However,

because the speaker remains affiliated with their political party, their neutrality is frequently challenged in

court. Let's look at now judicial review. Kihotu Holohan versus Zakilu in 1992.

Here the Supreme Court ruled that while the speaker makes the initial decision, their ruling is a tribunal order and is

fully subject to judicial review by high courts and the Supreme Court. Let's look at setting a deadline. The

Kaisham Mhachandra Singh 2020 case. The Supreme Court here held that state speakers should ideally decide

disqualification petitions within 3 months barring extraordinary circumstances.

Let's look at the speaker facing removal in Subhash Desai Maharashtra crisis of 2023.

The Supreme Court analyzed how rebel factions send notices to remove the speaker to prevent the speaker from

disqualifying them under the 10th schedule affirming that legislative party actions cannot override the

organizational structure of the core political party. Now to stop the recurring instability in

state governments, major constitutional committees have proposed key changes. The first one

independent tribunal moving the power to decide disqualification away from the speaker

to an independent permanent tribunal headed by a retired judge. Supreme Court recommendation or to the governor acting

on the binding advice of the election commission then the Goswami committee law

commission. We can also talk about the restricting whips. That means amending the law so

that party whips apply only to critical votes affecting government stability like no confidence motions, budget money

bills, leaving legislators free to vote their conscience on ordinary bills. The third thing we can look at here is

barring reelection which mandates that any MLA who defects or resigns to alter government

majorities be barred from contesting elections or holding renumerative political office for the remainder of

that assembly term. Now in all of this therefore what are your major reform suggestions?

Increase the number of annual sitting days. Strengthen question hour and zero hour.

Make committee scrutinary mandatory for significant bills. Enhance research and technical support

for MLAs. Improve transparency through digital legislative platforms.

Clarify the constitu role of governors. Encourage wider public participation in the legislative process.

Review the functioning and utility of legislative councils. Promote greater representation of women

and marginalized groups. Improve financial oversight through stronger public accounts and estimate

committees. And therefore in this debates on the state parliaments

of the state legislators, the vidan sabhas and the vidhan saas and the assemblies we can conclude that the

debates surrounding the state legislators reflect broader questions about

federalism, democratic accountability, legislative efficiency and constitutional governance in India. Now,

while state legislatures remain the principal institutions for representing regional interests and making state

laws, concerns over declining deliberation, executive dominance, centralization,

and institutional effectiveness have prompted calls for comprehensive reforms.

Strengthening these legislators is essential for ensuring cooperative federalism, responsive governance and a

vibrant democratic system. [music]